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The purpose of this research is to develop baseline research that can be expounded by 
future researchers to solidify the warrant officer track as a solution to creating a better 
contracting workforce through increased experience and more confidence within the 
contracting career field. This research investigates the perceived benefits and contrasting 
effects of adding the warrant officer track into the contracting career field. The 
assessment uses personal interviews and surveys covering job satisfaction model and 
expectancy theory. In addition, pay charts and scales are used to assess cost. Currently 
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This chapter presents the background, purpose, and research questions, for the 
proposal of integrating warrant officers into Air Force (AF) contracting. The overall 
problem facing Air Force contracting is that low staffing and experience have led to poor 
contract administration and turnover problems. As paraphrased from the article “In 
Betweeners” the AF stopped making appointments to the rank of warrant officer in 1959 
due to not being able to find a proper niche for the rank. The Air Force claimed that the 
warrant officer did not “fit” into its current rank schema, resulting in another rank that 
was sandwiched between the enlisted and commissioned officers. However, to fill the gap 
in middle management, the AF created two higher additional ranks, those of Senior 
Master Sergeant (E-8) and Chief Master Sergeant (E-9). The creation of these ranks has 
done little for creating technical experts or filling the void of middle management. “The 
Air Force, they contend, is losing the best and the brightest to its sister services by 
offering no step up for enlisted members other than a bachelor’s degree and Officer 
Training School.” (Dorr, 2010) 
The purpose of this study is to research the feasibility of changing the 
organizational structure of AF operational squadrons to include the warrant officer (WO). 
Warrant officer is defined by the United States Army Combined Arms Center as “officers 
that must be technically and tactically focused and able to perform the primary duties of 
technical leader, advisor, and commander. Through progressive levels of expertise in 
assignments, training, and education, warrant officers perform these duties during all 
operations and at all levels of command.” (ARMY, 2011), Commissioned officers, in the 
AF, as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 101, U.S. Congress are typically the only persons, in a 
military environment, able to act as the commanding officer of a military unit (GOV, 
2011). In addition, we believe we can incentivize and retain our more knowledgeable and 
experienced enlisted members from the ranks of E-4 through E-7 to stay in service and 
increase the government’s competitive advantage in contracting. Once an enlisted 
member advances beyond the rank of E-6, their professional responsibilities will no 
longer be focused on contract management. The enlisted member enters a political 
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spectrum that takes aim at networking, managing, upward movement, or retirement. The 
underlying problem is the lack of technical experts, which should fit into the middle tier 
of the contracting career field. Currently, there exists no middle tier for allowing 
personnel to truly specialize in contracting, which has lead to increased contractual 
expenditures.  
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) government contracting components have 
obligated 204,000 contractual actions valued at $64.9 billion dollars, which equated to 12 
percent of the $535 billion dollars obligated to products, services, and research and 
development in FY2010 (Correll, 2011). The total workforce is staffed with 8,329 
professionals, 2,093 military, 6,309 civilians, and is staffing 270 contracting offices 
(Office, 2010). Studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others, over 
many years, have identified opportunities to gain efficiencies and save costs by 
consolidating administrative, management, and operational functions (GAO-11-318SP).  
As quoted by Edward Deming, “An organization should create constancy of 
purpose toward improvement of product and service, with the aim to become competitive 
and stay in business, and to provide jobs.” (Deming, 2011) The current mindset of the 
AF leadership contradicts Deming by promoting cuts to personnel in one area and then 
overloading AFSCs in deficient areas with untrained and inexperienced personnel. This 
action is centered on cutting costs in the hopes of increasing revenues, which can be 
disastrous for both the private and public sectors, in addition to the contracting career 
field (Contracting reform of 1994).  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that agencies shall ensure that 
sufficiently trained and experienced officials are available within the agency to manage 
and oversee the contract administration function" (FAR, 37.102(h), 2004, p. 886). 
According to Professor Steven Schooner, the government lacks sufficient qualified 
acquisitions and contract management professionals to administer its outsourcing 
requirements (Schooner, 2004). This parallels many findings in recent GAO reports and 
an article by General Schakelford who has recognized that AF contracting is stretched 
beyond its limits with its personnel (Schakelford, 2011). The Inspector General (IG) of 
the DoD in a 2003 audit of contracts for administrative and management support services 
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supported the findings. Based on the Schooner and Schakelford reports, leadership has 
found that the AF acquisition community is not meeting regulations stated in the FAR, as 
directed by Congress.  
Furthermore, the IG supported the findings that the DoD did not have a sufficient 
number of trained personnel in place to support all of its contracts (IG report, 2003). This 
has led to bureaucratic reform within contracting. Consequently, Congress has provided 
more oversight on contractual procedures, pressuring contracting offices to perform 
better on contracts. Unfortunately, this reform does not strike at the heart of the problem 
faced by contracting offices in the AF. One of the more notable actions the AF has taken 
to address the overarching issue includes retention bonuses to military contracting 
employees to improve turnover. While the retention bonus has improved retention 
overall, ((Ginsberg-Jones May 2011). more can be done to incentivize our military to 
continue its commitments to serving this country. With more than 75 percent of the 
overall spending in service contracts across the DoD, enquiring minds need to assess 
whether making changes in operational contracting squadrons would improve the overall 
challenges in the acquisition community. 
The experience of the writers and some researchers on this subject indicate that 
poorly trained and inexperienced personnel who are assigned to contract administration 
pose a significant risk to successful contract performance (Allen, 2005). This conclusion 
can be drawn because inexperienced personnel are not as productive as experienced 
personnel in most cases. Therefore, it takes longer for contracting offices to get goods 
and services to those in need, which can translate to lives lost. By taking a vested interest 
in the development of contracting personnel, we can avoid or limit situations like Iraq 
and Afghanistan, where billions of dollars were lost on poor business dealings (Miller, 
2006) due to inexperienced contracting personnel. 
A possible solution to the problem we have highlighted is a reorganizational effort 
to implement warrant officers (WO) to improve the quality of our contracting personnel, 
increase the career field’s competitive advantage, and potentially save the AF millions of 
dollars. We suggest that the AF contracting WOs could serve as the catalyst and  
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cornerstone for the contracting career field, helping with retention and improving 
spending by keeping experienced personnel in positions where decisions on the 
expenditure of taxpayer dollars are made every day  
In the next chapter, a literature review is conducted to help readers better 
understand the material being researched. The research study rethinks the organizational 
structure of the acquisition community to meet the challenges of the complex 
environment of business in the 21st century. The study will be broken down into three 
sections to address this problem. In Chapter II, concepts of organizational behavior are 
assessed to create a model that addresses retention and productivity issues with Air Force 
contracting. In Chapter III, a cost analysis is conducted, based on organizational change, 
to look at the cost of implementing the proposed changes. Finally, based on the 
assumptions that the warrant officer will fill experience and staffing gaps in the present 
structure and save on staffing costs, Chapter V will discuss a training plan that is 
presented to give life to the program.  
This study pertains to the contracting officer rank structure within the United 
States Air Force. Specifically, this study will investigate the organizational structure of 
the contracting career field, and the overall cost benefit of adding warrant officers to this 
structure. Therefore, to address these issues, our research aims to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How will warrant officers fit into the AF contracting system?  
 
2. What are the benefits of having warrant officers?  
 
3. Will having warrant officers incentivize enlisted members to stay in Air 
Force contracting, helping to retain both experience and knowledge? 
 
4. What type of cost advantage or disadvantage will warrant officers bring to 





II. WARRANT OFFICER MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS 
This review dives into the turnover and productivity model in Figure 1, which 
suggests that the introduction of warrant officers (WO) to Air Force contracting may 
simultaneously improve productivity and reduce turnover. As indicated in the model, we 
suggest that a WO track will increase job satisfaction and job embeddedness, which in 
turn, will lead to a reduction in turnover. Moreover, the model suggests that warrant 
officers will increase productivity as a result of increases in human capital and enlisted 
motivation. The sections of this literature review provide a better understanding of the 
variables that ultimately affect an individual’s final decision to stay or leave an 
organization. Additionally, it offers insight into the motivational and human capital 
factors that impact productivity. 
A. THE INFLUENCE OF WARRANT OFFICERS ON THE REDUCTION OF 
VOLUNTARY TURNOVER 
The following section takes an in-depth look at the process through which WOs 
can reduce turnover in the Air Force contracting field. It begins with a general overview 
of turnover and its predictors and then offers two primary mechanisms (job satisfaction 
and job embeddedness) through which WOs will lead to reduced turnover. 
1. Turnover 
Turnover can be defined as the function of both desirability and ease of 
movement (March &Simon, 1958). It is important to know that turnover is both 
involuntary and voluntary. Voluntary turnover is associated with quitting or resigning, 
whereas involuntary turnover is associated with dismissals, layoffs, deaths, and 
retirement.. Organizations control involuntary turnover but do not control voluntary 
turnover, thus organizations need to best manage its people to reduce voluntary turnover. 
As such, this study focuses on the reduction of voluntary turnover in the Air Force. 
Turnover studies are of great importance because of the desire of practitioners to curb 
financial cost associated with turnover (Hom & Griffeth, 1995).  
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The primary predictors of voluntary turnover include: intent to leave/stay, job 
satisfaction, job embeddedness, and organizational commitment (Swider, Boswell & 
Zimmerman, 2011). Essentially, the more satisfied or embedded individuals are with their 
job, and the more committed they are to their employer, the less likely they are to 
voluntarily leave the organization. Furthermore, some demographic variables (such as 
age, gender, marital status, and number of dependents) have been shown to influence 
turnover indirectly through their impact on individuals’ intent to find other employment 
(Wellington, 1993).  
The findings of prior research have guided this study to look at two particular 
cognitive/affective predictors of turnover. Specifically, the variables researched for this 
study include job satisfaction and job embeddedness. As our model suggests, the increase 
in job satisfaction and embeddedness, resulting from a WO track, will reduce turnover in 
the contracting field. Simply put, if Air Force personnel are satisfied with and embedded 
in their jobs, they are less likely to resign. The following sections examine these two 
variables and their association with WOs and voluntary turnover in greater detail.  
2. Job Satisfaction  
Job satisfaction has been defined as a pleasurable or positive emotional state 
resulting from appraisal of one’s job or job experiences (Locke, 2004). Job satisfaction is 
symbolic of an individual’s feelings and thoughts about their job. Figure 2 shows many 
elements that attribute to job satisfaction. Different predictors of job satisfaction include: 
skill variety, autonomy, recognition, advancement, creativity, compensation and the work 
itself (Hackman & Oldham, 1980; Smith, Kendall & Hulin, 1969). As illustrated in 
Figure 3, when these variables are optimized, job dissatisfaction will be decreased and 
job satisfaction will be increased (Field, 2008).  
Low levels of job satisfaction lead to voluntary turnover (Hassel, 2005; Hom et 
al., 1984). Based on extensive evidence from research, military members that are 
dissatisfied with the Air Force will not reenlist (Smith, Holtom & Mitchel, 2010). 
Furthermore, dissatisfied employees tend to have less drive to produce work at a higher 
rate and can cause others to do less work, which leads to more dissatisfied employees. 
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Once employees are satisfied, it is more likely that they will not voluntarily leave the 
organization. Based on our assumptions and proposition, the predictors of job 
satisfaction, (advancement, creativity, compensation, responsibility, recognition and 
accomplishment) the warrant officer can potentially increase each of these areas by 
creating more upward mobility for the enlisted.  
The warrant officer position creates more upward mobility, giving the enlisted 
personnel more options to advance, and with advancement comes a higher level of 
authority for employees to use their own ideas to address problems. Furthermore, with 
advancement, the position of warrant officer will provide higher paying salaries, closing 
the gap of pay differences to outside organizations and DoD civilians. The warrant officer 
position is a higher level of authority, increasing an individual’s responsibilities and the 
number of subordinates that must be managed. The warrant officer rank is a position of 
leadership; therefore, WOs will receive more recognition for the success of their efforts 
and subordinates.  
Finally, the warrant officer position will challenge those who make the rank. The 
challenges in this position will provide increased responsibility and authority, giving a 
greater feeling of accomplishment upon completion of a complex task. The end result is 
that the warrant officer can increase satisfaction and decrease turnover.  
Proposition 1: The introduction of warrant officers into Air Force contracting 
will reduce voluntary turnover by increasing job satisfaction levels.  
3. Job Embeddedness 
Job embeddedness is a multi-dimensional combination of organizational and 
community influences that affect a person’s decision to stay with his or her organization 
(Mitchell et al., 2001). As our model in Figure 1 suggests, embeddedness is a variable 
that reduces turnover. Therefore, as individual levels of embeddedness increase within an 
organization, instances of turnover should decrease. It is important to note that job 
embeddedness is split into two components: organization-based and community-based 
(Hassel, 2005). As such, embeddedness suggests that people have many influences that 
affect their life space and lead them to become embedded in an organization and/or a 
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community. Nevertheless, given the mobility inherent in military careers, this study is 
primarily concerned with organization-based embeddedness. Specifically, individuals 
become embedded in their jobs when: (a) they feel a close link to their organization, (b) 
they feel that their organizations fit or complement each other, and (c) they feel they 
would make many sacrifices if they were to break the ties with their organization (Hassel, 
2005).  
Moreover, Mitchell et al. (2001) hypothesized job embeddedness would account 
for additional variance in turnover, above and beyond the traditional predictors (e.g., job 
attitudes and ease of movement). Job embeddedness promotes an image of attachment, 
suggesting that people who are more embedded are less likely to leave their job (Mitchell 
& Lee, 2001). This becomes an important factor because when people have a lot to lose 
in a sense of relationship to job, community and family, they are less likely to leave. This 
is no different for military personnel, especially: when military members hit ten years, at 
that point, they feel they have to stay in the military to earn retirement. Based on our 
assumptions and proposition, the predictors of embeddedness, (organizational sacrifice 
and fit to organization) can potentially be increased by the warrant officer program, 
which creates more upward mobility for the enlisted.  
The assumption that the warrant officer will increase organizational link, fit and 
sacrifice to organization is created based on the individuals’ increase in responsibility. 
When employees are promoted, they gain more responsibility in the success and failure 
of the mission. Work outcomes produced by the warrant officer and their subordinates are 
reflective of the warrant officer’s personal efforts. Their leadership will help people 
succeed or fail, creating a mentor and ownership bond with the organization. Increased 
responsibility personalizes the warrant officer’s involvement with the organization, 
strengthening the link between the warrant officer and the organization.  
This bond will also clearly define the role of the individual that holds the warrant 
officer rank. The warrant officer will have a better understanding of how he or she affects 
the overall success of the strategic mission. This will help the individual to know how 
they will better fit in the organization. In addition, the bond that is created will lend 
warrant officers to sacrifice more. If they leave the organization, they are leaving the 
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people that count on and look up to them. All these factors offer a warrant officer a lot 
more to lose than their enlisted subordinates. The end result is that the warrant officer can 
increase embeddedness and decrease turnover.  
Proposition 2: The introduction of warrant officers into Air Force contracting 
will reduce voluntary turnover by increasing organizationally based job embeddedness.  
B. THE INFLUENCE OF WARRANT OFFICERS ON INCREASES TO 
PRODUCTIVITY 
The following section takes an in-depth look at the process through which WOs 
can increase productivity in the Air Force contracting field. As suggested in Figure 1, our 
research indicates that WOs can lead to greater productivity by generating higher levels 
of human capital and motivation. These variables are discussed in greater detail below. 
1. Productivity 
Productivity is the ratio of effectiveness (output) to cost of achieving that level of 
effectiveness (input) (Landy & Conte, 2007). A simplified way of looking at productivity 
is by measuring the quality and quantity of the work provided by the effort put into the 
work. Both economists and sociologists have explored work productivity. Economists 
posit that productivity is largely related to human capital differences (Monk-Turner & 
Fogerty, 2010). Some of these differences include the level of formal education one 
attains as well as additional experience at work (Albelda & Tilly 1997; Becker 1964, 
1985; Mincer 1974; Mincer & Polachek 1974; Monk-Turner & Fogerty, 2010).  
Campbell, McCloy, Oppler & Sager (1993) postulate three determinants of job 
performance: declarative knowledge (DK), procedural knowledge skill (PKS) and 
motivation (M). DK deals with having information about a job or task, PKS deals with 
knowing how to perform a job or task and motivation deals with energy put toward work. 
Consistent with Campbell et al., our model reflects that higher levels of human capital 
and motivation will increase productivity as a result of WOs in Air Force contracting.  
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2. Human Capital 
Human Capital is defined as a unit’s composition of employees’ knowledge, skills 
and abilities (Ployhart, Iddekinge & Mackenzie, 2011). Globalization, technological 
advancement and market pressures have forced organizations to change the nature of 
human capital management (DiRenzo & Greenhaus, 2011). The military is currently 
giving bonuses to military personnel to retain its people. Furthermore, it is bringing in 
people from other career fields, but it is not focusing its efforts on those talented enlisted 
members that would be prime targets for private industry. Though civilian organizations 
are outsourcing work, and downsizing to lower cost (DiRenzo & Greenhaus, 2011), they 
are still hiring trained and experienced personnel from the military as a means to increase 
the company’s human capital.  
Human capital creates a competitive advantage and is arguably an organization’s 
most precious resource. Human capital creates innovation, develops best practices and 
problem solves in the turbulent business environment of the 21st century. The distinction 
that needs to be made with human capital is that scholars consider only unit-specific 
human capital to create a sustained competitive advantage (Ployhart, Iddekinge & 
Mackenzie, 2011). Therefore, more specialized expertise in human capital like the 
warrant officer will have a greater pay-off in productivity than a person that is trained to 
have general knowledge like an officer.  
On-the-job training creates unit-specific human capital, and more importantly, 
experience. As employees acquire greater experience, their work requires less conscious 
attention becoming more automatic (Ackerman, 1987). This creates more time for 
employees to give attention to unique customer needs and improving unnecessary 
bureaucratic processes. The warrant officer creates more human capital because this rank 
can only be attained through knowledge and experience in the career field.  
Officers and enlisted can make rank without expertise in contracting. For 
example, both officers and enlisted can cross train into contracting as company grade 
officers and NCOs. These individuals will be placed in charge of individuals without an 
in-depth knowledge of the work to be performed. The warrant officer rank will promote 
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those individuals who have proven themselves in the career field to lead, teach and 
manage the next generation. Therefore, the training should be superior and the output of 
work by the warrant officer should be superior. Thus the warrant officer will increase 
knowledge of the personnel and experience of the overall agency with commitments that 
should keep their knowledge until retirement.  
The human capital in an organization determines its competitive advantages. An 
organization’s goal is to retain its experienced employees to be more productive. There 
are tangible and intangible skills that individuals bring. It is hard to decipher which set of 
skills makes one individual more productive than the next. The warrant officer program 
will focus on those personnel that have talented technical skills with contract 
management. Those talented employees that take this route will have the chance to rise 
up the corporate ladder while keeping their experience at the operational level. This 
experience in the office should translate into increased productivity.  
Proposition 3: Warrant officers in Air Force contracting will generate greater 
productivity by increasing unit-level human capital. 
3. Motivation 
Motivation is defined as the energetic forces that originate inside and outside an 
employee, initiating effort and determining intensity and persistence of work (Colquitt, 
Lepine & Wesson, 2010). Motivation exists in two forms, known as intrinsic and 
extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation refers to the individual’s desire to expend effort based on 
interest in the work that is being performed (Grant & Berry, 2011). Extrinsic motivation 
refers to the individual’s desire to give effort based on interest in receiving a reward. For 
the purpose of this research, motivation will be looked at with a holistic view of how the 
possibility of a warrant officer program could improve enlisted motivation in Air Force 
contracting offices.  
Recent research on motivation suggests employees become more creative when 
motivated. Motivation channels employees to produce ideas that are creative and useful 
to an organization (Grant & Berry, 2011). It is the goal of organizations, both public and 
private, to create intrinsic and extrinsic motivation so that a person is driven to improve 
 12
performance. Research has shown that people with strong positive motivation tend to 
have higher levels of task performance. Motivating forces with the strongest performance 
effect is self-efficacy because people feel a sense of internal confidence to outperform 
those who doubt their capabilities (Colquitt, Lepine & Wesson, 2010).  
To better understand motivation, this study looks at one of many theories that give 
insight into the topic of motivation. The main theory that applies to our suggested model 
is the equity theory. Equity theory suggests that individuals look at their world in terms of 
comparative inputs and outcomes (Landy & Conte, 2005). Equity theory states that 
employees make cognitive appraisals of their inputs relative to the outputs they receive 
(Barling & Cooper, 2008). This finding parallels the concept of production, which 
compares inputs to outputs.  
By adding the warrant officer incentive, enlisted that obtain the rank receive 
greater outcomes such as pay and respect. Moreover, this incentive directly tailors to 
personnel who have the attitude and aptitude to obtain the rank. This is a potential 
improvement to the bonus, which does not differentiate the talented from the average. 
Moreover, enlisted, for the most part, perform the same job as officers and civilians in 
operational contracting squadrons. Therefore, the opportunity to achieve WO can offer 
gifted administrators, that don’t make it to the officer core, another means to progress 
with their talents.  
Once again, as depicted in the model, the warrant officer should touch on both 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivational forces that improve productivity by bringing more 
equity between talented enlisted and the officers and civilians they work next to in 
operational contracting offices. Thus, the warrant officer will have an affect on intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation that should increase productivity in contracting organizations.  
Proposition 4: Warrant officers in Air Force contracting will generate greater 
productivity by increasing the motivation of enlisted personnel. 
4. Synthesis 
Job satisfaction, embeddedness, motivation, and human capital are all areas of 
concern that the contracting community is trying to improve. The question becomes how 
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does the Air Force keep its experience and the right personnel? Contracting needs people 
who display positive aptitude and attitude toward contracting in administration as well as 
entrepreneurial/business savvy. The Air Force is in direct competition with private 
organizations and other government entities that are looking for the same qualities.  
Furthermore, other organizations, like the Army and private industry, are offering 
desirable job alternatives. For example, the Army is offering civilian jobs at GS-11 or 
higher that are equivalent to work performed by Air Force enlisted. The catch is that the 
civilian jobs offer around two times the base pay of enlisted employees 
(www.militaryfactory.com;  www.opm.gov, 2011). Private industry, in some cases, can 
pay three times or more the enlisted pay rate (www.payscale.com, 2011). These options 
make it challenging for the Air Force to maintain its experience. Based on the research 
found in the review of literature, the warrant officer will create two outcomes, as seen in 
Figure 1. By way of increased job satisfaction, embeddedness, motivation and human 
capital, the warrant officer will improve productivity through increased experience, and 
reduce turnover by giving quality enlisted members another road on which to excel.  
5. Analysis 
We attempted to test the propositions described in this chapter through both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. A survey was created to assess the influence 
of WO on turnover via job satisfaction and job embeddedness. We were unable to acquire 
an appropriate sample for quantitative statistical analysis of this process. As such, that 
portion of our study remains theoretical in nature and we call for future research to test 
our first two propositions on a sample of enlisted Air Force personnel. We were able to 
address Propositions 3 and 4 through qualitative methods. Interviews were conducted on 
commanders of contracting squadrons aimed at studying predictors of motivation and 
human capital. The interviews helped researchers gain insight into the relationship 
between WO and productivity, through presumed increases in human capital and 
motivation. The research questions addressed in these interviews include: 
 
1. What are the benefits of having warrant officers? 
 
2. How will warrant officers fit into the Air Force contracting system?  
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3. Will having warrant officers incentivize enlisted members to stay in Air Force 
contracting, helping retain both experience and knowledge?  
The interview consisted of twenty-one questions. Ten questions were reserved for 
motivation and eleven questions reserved for human capital (capability). A total of four 
commanders were interviewed in the process with an average of 18.125 years of 
experience. Two lieutenant colonels and two majors were interviewed.  
6. Human Capital Analysis 
We attempted to answer research questions pertaining to the benefits of having 
warrant officers and how warrant officers fit into the AF contracting system. Proposition 
3 suggested that warrant officers will improve productivity through increased experience. 
Based on this proposition, questions were asked about benefits of warrant officers and 
how commanders would use them. During our initial analysis, interviewees determined 
that efficiency in contracting positions could be attained anywhere between four to fifteen 
years. After averaging the interviewees’ statements, we concluded that contracting 
professionals require approximately seven to eight years experience to be efficient in 
fulfilling contracting position duties.  
The problem that contracting squadrons are seeing is that they are losing people 
with experience of four years or more to voluntary turnover. Furthermore, these people 
are being promoted to positions where they perform functions that directly affect the 
output of contracts. The first question of the interview was direct. Commanders were 
asked how they think warrant officers can improve mentorship in a contracting squadron. 
Three of four commanders believed warrant officers would be good for the organization 
and improve mentorship in the squadron. One commander specifically stated that “senior 
members would always be good for any organization.”  
Another commander discussed the benefits warrant officers bring because they 
hold time and rank. He stated that “more responsibility could be given to warrant officers 
because they do not have the newness of the CGO, they are close enough to the work to 
keep a good perspective on the mission and they have the training to accomplish complex 
tasks.” The one commander that was skeptical of warrant officers improving mentorship 
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in the squadron believed they would not provide any more mentorship than SNCOs and 
NCOs who are doctrinally required to provide mentorship to enlisted airmen.  
This is a valid concern, but the differences researchers see between NCOs or 
SNCOs and warrant officers are rank, warrants, and higher level responsibilities within 
the organization. First and foremost is rank, which gives warrant officers more power, 
respect, and authority to execute their decisions. Secondly, warrant officers hold an actual 
warrant and would be able to provide better guidance on requirements to complete a 
contract. NCOs and SNCOs are not awarded warrants in many squadrons. Thirdly, NCOs 
and SNCOs are required to fulfill squadron superintendent and first shirt duties as the 
highest-ranking enlisted members of the squadron. The responsibilities and time 
requirements associated with these positions pulls them away from their contracting 
duties.  
In most cases, contracting SNCOs hold superintendent positions in squadrons that 
do not administer contracts. Being absent from offices that administer contracts, SNCOs 
and NCOs will not be as connected to daily contracting operations and requirements. 
Warrant officers, however, who are designed to work directly within the offices that 
administer contacts, will be present, active and directly leading those operations. Finally, 
contracting is filling most of its NCO positions with cross trainees. Cross trainees are 
pulled from other career fields, such as security forces or manpower and personnel and 
expected to permanently, proficiently perform contracting duties. Cross trainees will have 
less than four years experience, and by the time they become efficient contract 
administrators, they are being promoted and no longer administering contracts. The 
apparent problem is that the Air Force depends on NCOs to train our CGOs and airmen.  
The high-cross training and turnover rate leaves inexperienced people, the blind 
leading the blind, so to speak. In some cases, the airmen are the most capable members of 
flight without truly being the expert that is needed. This, in itself, brings a number of 
problems because it can hurt the psyche of airmen with regard to the level of respect they 
have for their leadership. To this point, one of the most experienced commanders 
interviewed stated, “we have flooded the career field with too many cross trainees and 
inexperienced civilians that we no longer have the mid-level experienced NCOs to teach  
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our younger force how to succeed.” This leads to how we see warrant officers adding 
productivity and fixing this problem. As stated earlier, all commanders agreed that more 
experience is needed in the squadron.  
The most important area that commanders perceived warrant officers would help 
was in the training program. Most commanders would prefer their warrant officers to run 
this program. To conclude our section on human capital, the commanders had a 50/50 
split on how they perceived the warrant officer affecting officers and the enlisted 
personnel. Two commanders believed warrant officers would not have a significant affect 
in a contracting squadron.  
Their biggest concerns were the negative affects warrant officers would have on 
the dynamics of officers with the enlisted and the senior ranking enlisted. Most people 
would argue that enlisted personnel with 20-plus years should be in a strategic leadership 
role. We disagree with that notion. The strategic leaders and managers in contracting 
offices should be the officers and civilians. What the Air Force contracting office is 
missing is the middle tier expertise that can manage the detailed nature of contracting 
work.  
This falls in line with what the other two commanders perceived. They saw 
warrant officers as having a good impact on the squadron. One commander said that he 
saw the benefits of the warrant officer directly improving “mission focus, professionalism 
and attitude overall.” Based on the interview responses, it is concluded that the warrant 
officer position can increase productivity in the office through increased experience 
(human capital).  
7. Motivation 
Proposition 4 indicated that warrant officers will improve productivity through 
increased motivation. Our analysis starts with interviewees’ perspectives on the question, 
“What do you believe motivates your airmen to work most?” We start with their quotes: 
Having clear direction training and ownership of their duties and 
responsibilities as well as a disciplined environment where expectations 
are set. 
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Decisive leadership, training, and camaraderie. 
Mission, being part of a team, and not wanting to let other airmen fail. 
The underlying issue that they are part of something bigger than 
themselves. I believe they understand what they do all day, every day is 
directly tied to the USAF mission and are depended upon very heavily to 
make things happen. 
What is deduced from these quotes is that leadership is highly valued by the 
enlisted workforce. Currently, the military is a voluntary force. Furthermore, we take the 
position, from their quotes that they perceive a large proportion of enlisted personnel 
joined the military because they wanted to serve their country. When the question was 
asked about what motivates enlisted personnel the least, the following answers were 
given. 
Negative reinforcement and lack of appreciation for what they do. Hostile 
work environments. 
Poor or unexplained decisions from leadership, lack of 
authority/empowerment. 
Any type of conflict. Feeling disrespected as a person, would drive an 
airmen to work less as a revenge factor. 
Poor leadership and morale. 
A common theme is seen in factors that motivate and demotivate enlisted 
personnel and leadership. If leadership is good or bad it will affect the motivation levels 
of the enlisted. Commanders and SNCO’s can be great leaders, but sometimes bad or 
inexperienced middle management can undermine their efforts. What was seen in our 
research of squadrons is that NCOs and CGOs fill middle management. In most cases, 
CGOs in operational contracting have less than four years’ experience.  
Contracting is filling most of its NCO ranks with cross trainees. The result is that 
most of the technical experts have less than four years’ experience and, therefore, many 
junior enlisted personnel have equal or greater experience than their bosses. This hinders 
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middle management’s ability to give clear direction and leadership in a technical field 
and can hurt morale directly. All the commanders interviewed unanimously concluded 
that the enlisted personnel would like to see more experienced military personnel in 
contracting. It is safe to assume that they all know that there is a deficiency affecting 
operations and morale.  
This brings us to the final question for the purpose of this analysis, which was 
how the commanders believed the possibility of a warrant officer grade motivates the 
enlisted personnel. The responses were similar in that there was uncertainty in how the 
warrant officer grade would motivate the enlisted. One commander suggested it would 
affect “only a few select that are the very best technicians that would be motivated to 
attain the rank.” Another commander saw the warrant officer grade having a minimal 
effect. He believed that airmen are more motivated to become senior enlisted. Another 
commander believed “it would only affect career airmen who were going to stay in 
anyway.” The final commander was also neutral on the topic saying that “only a few 
select would work for it.”  
The warrant officer grade would be an incentive for those enlisted members that 
have the aptitude and attitude for the job. This incentive would not attract those people 
who do not have an aptitude or attitude for the job. It would be focused on filling the 
experience gap that currently exists. This could be an improvement to the CRSB (critical 
retention and skills bonus) that does not discriminate who we keep in Air Force 
contracting. Instead, the CRSB incentivizes productive and unproductive employees. 
Warrant officers would boost extrinsic and intrinsic motivation for those personnel who 
want to write contracts and avoid politics.  
The next point made by the commanders was that a majority would like to see 
more warrants in the squadron. The only contrasting thought to the idea of having more 
warrants was that warrants must be balanced with the workload. As we know, contracting 
actions and dollars have been on the rise and the acquisition workforce has been cut. 
There is an effort to increase the workforce, but we are doing this by hiring people 
without experience instead of figuring ways to keep our experience. The warrant officer 
position will help contracting squadrons by increasing the number of people in the office 
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that can sign for contracts. In one commander’s opinion, “this in itself would increase 
morale, produce a higher quality of contracting specialist that would award requirements 
faster.”  
Going back to the research questions, the first question asked was how would 
warrant officers fit into the AF contracting system? The answer that we gleaned from the 
commanders is that they can see the warrant officer working as a training officer. They 
also suggested using the warrant officer as a customer liaison creating programs like a 
customer college to educate base personnel and vendors on the acquisition program. The 
second research question asked was about the benefits of having warrant officers? The 
commanders’ responses varied from mentors to training managers to customer liaisons 
and expert contracting personnel. The benefits are as numerous as the imagination of the 
leaders that are commanding warrant officers.  
The final research question, that was answered indirectly, was whether having 
warrant officers would incentivize enlisted members to stay in Air Force contracting, 
helping retain both experience and knowledge. A majority of the commanders were torn 
by this question, believing that warrant officers would have a minimal affect on 
incentivizing enlisted members to stay in Air Force contracting. The enlisted personnel 
will be motivated by having more experience to lean on, but not all enlisted will be 
motivated by the opportunity to reach the warrant officer ranks. Either way we look at the 
situation, the warrant officer track, based on the comments of the commanders, can 































Figure 2.   Facet of Job Satisfaction (From Hackman & Oldham, 1980; Smith, 

















III. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Organizational change is the study of change, development, and transformation in 
organizations (Barling & Cooper, 2004). In the last two decades, authors have 
increasingly framed organizational change as a strategic imperative (e.g., Oswick et al., 
2005), citing major modifications in government regulations, global competition, and 
technology as factors that contribute to the need to implement change on an ongoing 
basis (Barling & Cooper, 2004).  
The policy that directs change in the U.S. Air Force acquisition community is 
WSARA, 2009. One of the initiatives of this policy is to strengthen the acquisition 
workforce to have the capacity in knowledge and experience to address the procurement 
of goods and services (Kendall, 2011). The U.S. Army is already taking steps to 
implement change to their contracting offices and the Air Force should follow suit.  
The Army is seriously considering warrant officers in their contracting offices. 
They plan to grow their force by offering a blue to green program where Air Force NCOs 
will attain the status of Army warrant officer (Hess, 2010). As discussed in the last 
chapter, opportunities in the external environment can increase employees’ intent to 
leave. This offer by the Army will incentivize many Air Force NCOs to voluntarily leave 
for increased pay while maintaining military benefits. Therefore, there is cause for the 
Air Force to change aspects of its organization to secure its human capital. 
Different types of organizational change include episodic and continuous changes. 
Episodic change describes changes that are infrequent, discontinuous, and international 
(Barling & Cooper, 2004). Episodic changes occur during periods of organizational 
disequilibrium started by external events like a decline in organizational performance 
(Barling & Cooper, 2004). Continuous change describes changes that are ongoing, 
evolving, and cumulative (Barling & Cooper, 2004). These changes occur in response to  
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everyday contingencies and circumstances (Orlikowski, 1996). Changing Air Force 
contracting offices to include the warrant officer is the proposed change this study looks 
at. 
Episodic change is hard to implement because it requires deliberate efforts from 
change agents to fight organizational inertia (Barling & Cooper, 2004). In the last decade, 
the Air Force tried to implement episodic change with the Air Force Installation 
Acquisition Transformation (IAT) program. IAT was designed to create the most 
efficient and effective installation acquisition organization, consistent with the goals of 
Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st century (AFSO21).However, during the 
implementation planning, several factors caused Air Force contracting leaders to relook 
at the risks involved.  
Lessons learned from other transformation efforts, coupled with the economic 
downturn, indicated that few of the personnel needed to staff the regional groups would 
actually move. In addition, infrastructure and information technology upgrades failed to 
materialize, contracting operations and deployment tempo elevated, and key stakeholders, 
while agreeing on the need for IAT, voiced concerns on the implementation (Force, 
2009). The lessons learned have been taken into consideration and the proposed change 
of the warrant officer does not ask for as much sacrifice.  
For the purpose of this study, a current and typical operational contract 
organizational structure is examined compared to the proposed organizational structure 
with the warrant officer. We will explain in more depth the Air Force contracting 
organization and warrant officers. From there, we will compare the organizational 
structure of a current Air Force contracting office to the proposed design that will include 
warrant officers. We will break down how the new structure can improve upon the old 
structure and this will lead into the next chapter where we will analyze the cost benefits 
of making the change.  
1. Air Force Contracting 
To begin, an Air Force contracting office is a unit that negotiates the sale of 
reliable, durable, high-quality supplies and equipment at the right time and place in order 
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to ensure mission success. Contracting helps ensure that Air Force units are well-stocked 
by managing contracts for commodities, services, and construction. Contracting units 
also follow marketing trends, evaluate offers, gather supply sources and consolidate and 
share their findings to maximize efficiency and set appropriate terms in contracts. The 
contracting organization ultimately ensures that contracted systems and functions are 
responsive to mission needs and in keeping with regulatory requirements. 
2. Key Functions and Tasks 
• Plan and organize contracting operations 
• Establish organizational structure and personnel 
• Select contract sources, negotiate and ensure compliance 
(Defense, Careers, 2011) 
There are two designations of personnel in contracting offices. They are either 
contracting officers or contracting specialists. As stated by the FAR, a contracting officer 
is an agent who has the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and 
make related determinations and findings. Contracting officers may bind the government 
only to the extent of the authority delegated to them. Contracting officers shall receive 
from the appointing authority clear instructions, in writing, regarding the limits of their 
authority. Information on the limits of the contracting officers’ authority shall be readily 
available to the public and agency personnel. No contract shall be entered into unless the 
contracting officer ensures that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and 
all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met 
(University, 2011). 
The official definition of a contracting specialist is not stated in the FAR, 
however, they advise the government and contractor personnel on contracting related 
issues. Additionally, they assist in the award of contracts by preparing documents, 




systems and other electronic methods. The most significant aspect is that they are not 
authorized to obligate the government. Therefore, they cannot make any final decisions 
as to whether the government will or will not make an award. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Typical Organizational Structure Without Warrant Officers 
Figure 4 shows the organizational structure of a contract office of an Air Force 
base within the continental United States. The structure is similar to what will be found in 
all bases in the continent of the United States and outside. Structures will differ slightly 
based on the size and type of mission. Some bases have as few as twenty-five personnel 
and others may have thirty-five or more. Some squadrons will separate offices by the 
items purchased. Therefore, construction purchases will be separated from services and 
commodities purchases.  
The managers of these offices can be called flight chiefs or team leads. In most 
cases, these are the only positions eligible to sign contracts that obligate taxpayer dollars 
based on the current organizational structure. As described in their core documentation, 
these personnel act as managers in their area of expertise. In the example, we see that the 
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office manager gives oversight to both construction and service contracts. In the current 
structure, the LGCA and LGCB team leaders will be headed by civilians. These team 
leaders or flight chiefs will distribute workloads and manage all the respective work in 
their area of expertise. In addition, the team leader or flight chief will usually have a 
warrant and sign for a majority of contracts within their area of expertise.  
The next person in charge of these structures will be a company grade officer. The 
company grade officer is considered the officer in charge and acts as an assistant 
manager. The company grade officer will assist the civilian team lead or flight chief in 
managing all contracts in their office. It is typical to see 100 or more contracts flow 
between each office. Members under the company grade officer to include the company 
grade officer will administer these contracts. Under the company grade officer is the 
noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) who will be the highest ranking enlisted 
person. It is the job of the NCOIC to deal with all enlisted personnel matters in addition 
to administering contracts. The NCOIC will most likely not hold a warrant and will be a 
contract specialist. 
The Company Grade Officer (CGO), NCOIC, and everyone else under these 
positions, both civilian and military, will be contract specialists, performing contract 
administration. The squadron commander, squadron superintendent, or the CGO may 
assign additional duties to military members as required. These additional duties can 
include functions such as Unit Fitness Program Monitor, Unit Deployment Manager, Unit 
Training Manager, or fill-ins for squadron superintendents. These additional duties can 
disrupt the oversight and administration of contracts.  
Based on an analysis from Dr. Michels, the current structure strains the ability of 
the installation contracting community to effectively perform its mission (Michels J., 
2009). The findings of Dr. Michels support the analysis of the writers of this article that 
there is room for improvement in this structure. Therefore, the focus area of change 
proposed by this study is on the military personnel level currently held by CGOs. The 
suggested proposal is removing CGOs from the deputy position (assistant manager) and 




Figure 5.   Organizational Structure with Warrant Officers 
The revised organizational structure with warrant officers will apply at 
operational contracting units. A substantial portion of warrant officer selectees will be 
introduced to the program from within the current contracting acquisition workforce. The 
realignment in personnel under this structure consists of repositioning a CGO under the 
supervision of the Director of Business Operations, (DBO) who is the head civilian of the 
entire contracting organization. Moreover, the warrant officers will fill deputy flight lead 
of construction contracting offices, LGCA, and service contracting offices, LGCB, 
respectively.  
The roles and  responsibilities of the DBO provide the necessary oversight and 
direction to the entire contracting unit to ensure successful market research, acquisition 
planning, contract award, contract performance management, and interpretation of 
contract law (Force S. o., 2005). As supervisors of newly assigned CGOs, DBOs will 
guide in the full range of contract management to include all pre and post award 
functions. This will provide future squadron commanders the overarching understanding 
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of contracting practices and procedures beneficial in their career progression. The next 
change is incorporating warrant officers into the deputy flight lead position. 
The implementation of the warrant officer in the deputy flight lead position will 
not change the roles and responsibilities of the position. However, warrant officers can 
aid in achieving efficiency by bringing another warrant to assist the flight chief/team 
lead. Their unique technical expertise in the revised structure can directly minimize the 
contractual touch time. Additionally, under the current structure the lieutenant is limited 
in experience when it comes to making essential procurement decisions, which opens the 
door to redundancy in efforts and inefficient use of time. More specifically, warrant 
officers can (1) increase quality control; (2) enhance training requirements of 
subordinates; and (3) address issues frequently directed towards the flight leads. The 
goals, objectives, and specific initiatives outlined above will provide a launching point 
for the effective and efficient cost analysis supported in Chapter IV. 
3. Analysis 
This proposed change can assist in strengthening the core knowledge base in the 
contracting office. CGOs lack the extensive skill set or experience of a seasoned 
employee to make informed decisions on complex issues. This is of extreme importance 
in the absence of civilians with signature authority who usually make decisions. 
Contracting is a detailed business that requires expertise only gained through hands-on 
experience. CGOs can be satisfactory contract administrators, but they will not offer the 
mentorship and guidance in contract administration that is needed.  
The critical need to implement a warrant officer program in Air Force contracting 
with highly qualified noncommissioned officers is based on the decrease in journeyman 
and master skill-level positions over the last ten years (Michels J., 2009). The warrant 
officer will be the signing authority needed to make sound decisions regarding the course 
of a contract. By incorporating warrant officers, the Air Force can supplement 
inexperienced CGOs by bringing in a fully trained, knowledgeable, and technically 
capable component to be utilized in critical contracting positions. In addition, they would  
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be able to supervise and mentor all levels of contracting employees, both officer and 
enlisted. Realigning the organizational structure to include the warrant officer can help 














IV. COST ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate the costs of an Air Force 
Operational Contracting Organizational Structure with and without warrant officers. The 
transition from the current contracting personnel structure to the structure implementing 
warrant officers could improve Air Force contracting capabilities. This realignment could 
also result in cost savings. President Obama wants the national security establishment to 
find an additional $450 billion in cuts—and most of those savings are expected to come 
from the Pentagon budget (Clark, 2011). Additionally, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon 
Panetta’s memorandum addressed “eliminating wasteful spending, consolidating 
duplicative functions, and driving ongoing and new efficiencies initiatives that can help 
achieve the aggressive budgetary goals” (Weisgerber, 2011). Senior defense and military 
leaders are in opposition to substantial cuts to the number of Soldiers, Sailors, airmen and 
Marines who serve the nation. However, the tremendous challenge of balancing mission 
success, mission funding, and mission resources will require the retention of well-trained 
personnel in critical career fields. Air Force Contracting is one of those critical career 
fields as determined by the force development council. 
The DoD expends billions of taxpayer dollars each year to recruit, retain, and 
motivate its personnel using other pays and benefits. In fiscal year 2008, for active duty 
servicemembers, the DoD spent $17.1 billion on nontaxable housing allowances; $10.9 
billion on health care for active duty servicemembers and their dependents; $31.4 billion 
on retirement pay and retiree health care; and $6.4 billion on special and incentive pays, 
such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). To meet retention 
goals in the contracting career field, bonuses have been established to influence 
contracting servicemembers to remain in the military to meet present and future readiness 
capabilities. The Air Force has maxed out its statutory limit for SRBs in the contracting 
career field. However, with high demands in civilian sectors for purchasing agents, the 
bonuses have delivered marginal results. In efforts to proactively counterbalance costs, 
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additional alternatives are required to incentivize military members’ individual choices. 
The concept of implementing the warrant officer rank into AF contracting will provide an 
alternate retention incentive as a more attractive opportunity for personal advancement. 
The driving factors for change in the traditional contracting structure are targeted to 
increase core competencies by retaining skilled personnel, while simultaneously being 
fiscally efficient.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “Opportunities to Reduce 
Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance 
Revenue” highlighted opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues 
ranging from tens of millions to several billion dollars annually (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). 
For example, the report illustrated how realigning the DoD’s military medical command 
structures and consolidating common functions could increase efficiency and result in 
projected savings ranging from $281 million to $460 million annually (GAO-11-318SP). 
These projected cost savings can also be met by the implementation of the Air Force 
contracting warrant officer initiative. The objective of this cost benefit analysis, therefore, 
is to analyze the estimated costs associated with establishing a WO personnel structure 
within Air Force contracting.  
This analysis is intended to be a tool to measure end state personnel costs based 
on certain personnel assumptions in Chapter III. As a result, dollar estimates are subject 
to change given the changes in both the annual basic pay increases and benefit estimates. 
Finally, to address end-strength and budgetary challenges, we recommend a revised 
personnel structure with the implementation of the warrant officer position to realize 
potential cost savings.  
B. RELATED LITERATURE 
1. Environment 
While the vision and mission of all military services have evolved over the last 
decade, this ever-changing environment has filtered into the fundamental operations of 
Air Force contracting. As stated in Chapter III, the draw down in force between 1990 and 
1995 has affected workforce competency. The long-term end strength of Air Force 
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Contracting depends on its ability to adapt to changing dynamics and selecting innovative 
ways to accomplish that mission. This clash of forces has also been intensified by the 
lack of strength and competency of the workforce. This increasing demand of skilled 
personnel attracted to the civilian sector demonstrates that Air Force contracting has one 








      
               
Figure 6.   Loss Rate for Officers 
As a result, over the last two decades, the total Air Force Contracting workforce 
has decreased by about half and the number of dollars obligated has increased 75 percent 
(Air Force Contracting Strategic Plan 2009–2013). With an increasing number of retiring 
and retirement eligible personnel and budget constraints limiting the number of new 
recruits, the workforce is facing a critical juncture (Air Force Contracting Strategic Plan 
2009–2013).   Given the decrease in workforce and increase in requirements, actions 
have been focused to meet numeric retention goals via selective reenlistment bonuses 
(SRB). Annual increased spending trends by the DoD on personnel costs may be lessened 
by the implementation of the Air Force Warrant Officer Program.  
Air Force Manpower Agency commanders are accountable for determining 
manpower requirements, developing program factors, and managing Air Force 
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performance management programs. According to the FY12 Air Force Posture 
Statement, The responsible source for providing Air Force leaders the tools to identify 
essential manpower requirements, forecasting accurate reenlistment rates can aid in 
effectively and efficiently accomplishing the Air Force mission (Salomon, 2007). Each 
fiscal year (FY), reenlistment goals are determined to meet end strength and mission 
requirements.  To meet these goals, the Air Force offers monetary reenlistment bonuses 
to servicemembers, who agree to reenlist in certain, designated critically manned Air 
Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs).  
C. HISTORICAL PAY AND BENEFITS 
Military pay is a measurable output developed through a designed strategy. Over 
the years, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) military compensation system has become 
an increasingly complex and piecemeal addition of pays, allowances, and benefits costing 
over $200 billion each year. Pay and benefits are important tools used by the DoD to 
recruit, retain, and motivate approximately 1.4 million active duty and 1.2 million 
reservists (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). In recent years, Congress has taken steps to fund 
enhanced compensation and benefit programs for active duty and reserve personnel at a 
time when many military personnel are spending months or years away from home, often 
in harm’s way (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). In 2005 and 2007, GAO found that the cost for 
military compensation was significantly increasing, and the total cost for compensation 
was not transparent because it was spread across different budgets within the DoD 
(GAO-11-318SP, 2011).  
The DoD and Congress have expanded military pay and benefits using a 
piecemeal approach rather than a total compensation approach that could help to balance 
the appropriateness, affordability, and sustainability of personnel-related costs. The GAO 
has estimated that the federal government’s total compensation costs for active duty 
servicemembers increased about 32 percent, using fiscal year 2008 constant dollars, from 
$143.8 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $189.4 billion in fiscal year 2008 (GAO-11-318SP, 
2011). Also,  the GAO found that using fiscal year 2008 constant dollars, the federal 
government’s total estimated compensation for reserve and national guard members grew 
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over 31 percent from about $17.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to nearly $23.5 billion in 
fiscal year 2008 (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). In 2000, the DoD authorized that basic pay for 
service members would rise 0.5 percentage points faster than wages in the civilian sector 
through 2006 (Office, 2007). Basic pay alone, the largest component of active duty 
military compensation, has increased from $45 billion to $50.1 billion between fiscal 
years 2000 and 2008 (GAO-11-318SP, 2011).  
Much of the increase in basic pay in recent years has been driven by concerns that 
military basic pay was not equivalent to civilian (or private sector) pay, without fully 
considering the full military compensation package (GAO-11-318SP, 2011). The GAO 
reported in April 2010 that studies done by the Congressional Budget Office and the 
Center for Naval Analyses concluded that when pay and benefits are taken into account, 
military compensation compares favorably to civilian compensation when considering 
personnel of similar age and education level (GAO-11-318SP, 2011)  In addition, recent 
growth of total compensation has been driven by the costs for deferred compensation, 
primarily attributed to enhanced health care benefits, and DoD officials anticipate 
significant continued growth in health care costs because of these expansions in coverage 
(GAO-11-318SP, 2011). These reports (GAO-11-318SP, 2011) and (Office, 2007), have 
identified significant cost parameters in analyzing factors included in implementing 
warrant officers.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
To understand the elevated levels of job satisfaction or dissatisfaction documented 
in Chapter II between FY 2010 and FY 2011, a proper assessment of military incentive 
alternatives must be linked to job embeddedness for enlisted servicemembers. The 
information gathered will address the internal service implications and fundamental 
advantages of implementing warrant officers in AF contracting using a cost benefit 
analysis approach. Additionally, a thorough examination of the current bonus structure, 
economic, and geographical compensation factors will be conducted, as they relate to 
financial returns.  
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Data was collected using quantitative measures. The quantitative information was 
compiled from data collected from the Military Composite Standard Pay Reimbursement 
Rate (MSCPRR) of FY2012. There are a total of 71 bases with two warrant officers 
assigned to each operational contracting squadron. We estimate that with a realignment 
of the current organizational workforce structure will provide greater utility in end 
strength. The pay of each military employee was collected and the delta of the two was 
multiplied by 71 operational squadrons. Such information will provide a baseline for the 
application for the warrant officer program and measurements for the distribution 
associated with operational contracting installations conus and oconus. Because of the 
evident distinctions in the installations vision, mission, and goal, our model does not 
represent the effects of each individually. These variables can consist of installation size 
and requirements obtained for daily functionality. This study builds the insight for 
reducing costs, increasing core competencies, and increasing retention. We perform our 
analysis using the given equation: 
 
               (Operational           
                                     (MSCPRR)                Contracting  
               Bases)       
 
The intent is to identify a steady course of action to create value from within. Our 
documentation could reveal potential alternative opportunities for advancement of our 
high-quality enlisted servicemembers in the ranks of E-5 to E-7, while meeting mandated 
initiatives by reducing cost growth.  
E. MILITARY COMPENSATION SUMMARY 
1. Monetary Compensation 
The relevant cost factors, which are a set of grade-specific cost factors for military 
personnel, are multiplied into the annual calendar parameters. Under DoD regulations, 
these are the rates to be used in cost calculation comparisons for civilianization purposes. 
The MCSPRR includes average basic pay for each military grade along with significant 
= Annual Costs 
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other pays including basic allowance for housing, and basic allowance for subsistence. 
All cost figures shown are fiscal year 2011 dollars. 
a. Basic Pay 
Basic pay is the fundamental component of military pay. All members 
receive it and, typically, it is the largest component of a member's pay. A member's grade 
(usually the same as rank) and years of service determine the amount of basic pay 
received. Basic pay is received by all and is the main component of an individual's salary. 
We will address basic pay because this factor will vary between enlisted and warrant 
officer pay grades.  
b. Allowances 
Allowances are the second largest element of military pay and will also 
vary between enlisted and warrant officers. Allowances are moneys provided for specific 
needs, such as food or housing. Monetary allowances are provided when the government 
does not provide for that specific need. For example, the quantity of government housing 
is not sufficient to house all military members and their families. Those who live in 
government housing do not receive full housing allowances. Those who do not live in 
government housing receive allowances to assist them in obtaining commercial housing. 
Basic Housing Allowance (BAH) is an allowance to offset the cost of housing when you 
do not receive government-provided housing. BAH depends upon your location, pay 
grade, and whether you have dependents. Additionally, BAH rates are set by surveying 
the cost of rental properties in each geographic location. Therefore, BAH rates in high-
cost areas will be much greater than those in low-cost areas. For example, according to 
the DoD, in 2011, the basic allowance for housing in the Washington, D.C., for the 
contracting commander in the rank of Major, is capped at approximately $2,739 a month. 
However, the basic housing allowance rate for the same rank in Washington State is 
$1,383 a month.  A majority of the force receives both the Basic Allowance for 
Subsistence (BAS) and BAH and, in many cases, these allowances comprise a significant 
portion of the member's total pay. 
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Basic Allowance for Subsistence is meant to offset costs for a member's 
meals. This allowance is based on the historic origins of the military in which the military 
provided room and board (or rations) as part of a member's pay. This allowance is not 
intended to offset the costs of meals for family members.  
BAS is intended to provide meals for the servicemembers; its level is 
linked to the price of food. Therefore, each year it is adjusted based upon the increase of 
the price of food as measured by the USDA food cost index. An increase to BAS will not 
necessarily be the same percentage as that applied to the increase in the pay table, as 
annual pay raises are linked to the increase of private sector wages and as authorized by 
Congress. 
The following Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) rates are the rates 
effective January 1, 2011 (militarypay.defense.gov/pay/BAS.html). 




c. Special Pays and Bonuses 
Special and Incentive (S&I) pays provide the services with flexible 
additional pays that can be used to address specific staffing needs and other force 
management issues that cannot be efficiently addressed through basic pay increases. For 
example, there are special pays for aviators and parachutists; special pays are also paid 
for dangerous or hardship duties (militarypay.defense.gov/pay/index.html). 
Unlike basic pay and allowances, which vary by pay grade and years of 
service, S&I pays can be used to improve recruiting and retention by increasing 
compensation in key occupation specialties or critical skill areas. These pays are also 
used to compensate for onerous or hazardous duty assignments or conditions. In addition, 
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S&I pays can be used to provide incentives for servicemembers to develop certain skills 
that are important to national security objectives. 
Currently, there are over sixty S&I pays authorized by law. For many of 
these pays, detailed eligibility requirements and precise payment amounts were set by 
law and could only be changed by congressional action. Previously, when needs or 
conditions change, force managers could sometimes not adjust S&I pay eligibility criteria 
or payment levels fast enough in response to those changing circumstances. So in 2008, 
Congress provided for a 10-year phased-in consolidation of S&I pays to eight broad 
categories allowing more flexibility and opportunity to adjust payment levels and 
eligibility criteria (militarypay.defense.gov/pay/special.html). 
d. Retirement Pay 
Members who accumulate twenty or more years of active service are 
eligible for retirement pay. There are three nondisability retirement plans currently in 
effect for active duty retirees. These are Final Pay plan, High-36 Month Average plan, 
and Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (more commonly referred to as REDUX) 
plan (militarypay.defense.gov/Retirement/activeduty.html). In support of the 
department’s efficiency initiatives, a small group of Defense Business Board members 
was tasked to develop alternative plans to the current military retirement system. The 
group briefed its findings and draft recommendations to the full board during their July 
21 quarterly meeting. According to Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, “There’s no immediate 
plan to affect retirement.”  
2. Nonmonetary Compensation 
a. Healthcare 
Military health care spending is rising twice as fast as the nation's overall 
health care costs, consuming a larger chunk of the defense budget as the Pentagon 
struggles to pay for two wars. 
 40
The surging costs are prompting the Pentagon and Congress to consider 
the first hike in out-of-pocket fees for military retirees and some active-duty families. 
Pentagon spending on health care has increased from $19 billion in 2001 to a projected 
$50.7 billion in 2011, a 167 percent increase. 
This rapid rise has been driven by a surge in mental health and physical 
problems for troops who have deployed to war multiple times and by a flood of career 
military retirees fleeing less-generous civilian health programs (Gregg Zoroya, 2010). 
Table 2.   Military Costs Estimates 




b. Tax Advantages 
While all pays are taxable, most allowances are tax-exempt. The primary 
allowances for most individuals are BAS and BAH, which are tax-exempt. Conus COLA 
is one allowance that is taxable. A law change mandated that every allowance created 
after 1986 would be taxable. CONUS COLA was authorized in 1995 and, thus, became 
the first taxable allowance. Tax savings can be significant as BAS and BAH averages 
over 30 percent of a member's total regular cash pay. In addition to being tax-exempt 
from Federal and State taxes, these allowances are also excluded from Social Security 
taxes. Working in a combat zone will trigger another tax advantage. Earnings received 
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while in the combat zone are excluded from taxable income. This exclusion is unlimited 
for enlisted members and warrant officers and is limited to $7,368.30 per month in 2009, 
for officers. If you spend a single qualifying day in the combat zone, your pay for the 
entire month is excluded from taxable income. Tax advantages effectively increase 
servicemembers’ take-home pay without an increase in pay.  
Bonuses and special pays are also excluded from taxable income if within 
the previously stated limitations and earned in the same month in which you served in a 
combat zone. For example, an enlisted person’s reenlistment bonus is excluded from 
taxes if the member reenlists in the same month in which the member served in a combat 
zone. Since there is no limitation on amounts excluded for enlisted members, the entire 
reenlistment bonus would be excluded. As another example, an officer's flight pay would 
also be excluded from taxable income, but only up to the point at which basic pay and the 
flight pay do not exceed the maximum enlisted pay amount. The Career Status Bonus 
received by members who may choose between High-3 and CSB/REDUX retirement 
plans and who elect the CSB/REDUX retirement plan also falls into this category. To be 
considered "earned" in the combat zone, the CSB/REDUX election must be accepted by 
the Service and considered final in the month in which the member was in the combat 
zone (militarypay.defense.gov/Pay/combatzone_exclusions.html). 
Although the listed monetary and nonmonetary compensation objectives 
may differ between the enlisted personnel and officers, the actual values represent a 
correlation in the DoD’s reenlistment rates and which AFSCs receive SRBs.   
F. SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT AND CRITICAL SKILLS RETENTION 
BONUSES (SRB AND CSRB) 
The overall Air Force budget for initial enlistment bonuses for FY12 is $14.5M, 
providing four and six year bonuses ranging from $1,000 to $17,000. This helps target 
hard-to-fill, chronically critical, and battlefield airmen occupational specialties 
(Ginsberg-Jones May 2011). While active duty officer retention, as a whole, remained 
strong through FY10, higher retention in targeted year groups for specific specialties 
including contracting, control and recovery, public affairs, civil engineering, intelligence, 
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logistics readiness, and certain medical specialties (Ginsberg-Jones May 2011). In FY11, 
the total budget set aside for officer and enlisted bonuses was $570.8 million, which 
equates to almost $35.6 million more than in FY10 (Rolfsen, 2010). Of the total, $248.2 
million went to SRB candidates and $322.6 was allocated to officer special pay (Rolfsen, 
2010).  
1. FY 2011 Retention Measures (Enlisted) 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program is a monetary incentive paid to 
Airmen serving in certain critical military skill areas who reenlist for additional obligated 
service (AFI 36-2606, 5-11). It is set subject to authorization under 37 USC 308 and the 
combined SRB and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses (CSRB) received by an individual 
servicemember throughout their career shall not exceed $200,000, unless specifically 
authorized as an exception (Dunbar, 2011). Additionally, eligible airmen may receive an 
SRB in each enlistment zone and the maximum SRB payable is $90,000 per zone 
(Dunbar, 2011). Bonuses are incentives used to attract and retain servicemembers in both 
enlisted and officer ranks. Most bonuses are focused on airmen in their first enlistments. 
“The bonuses are designed to encourage first-term airmen who have the option of  
changing career fields to go from what might be an overmanned career field into an 
undermanned career field and get a bonus (www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/01/air-
force-2011-service-retention-bonuses-010211w/).”  
Another reason the Air Force continues to target airmen in Zone A is because of 
the size of the 2005 year group. The Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) for contracting 
and the SRB multiplier is displayed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   AFSC SRB Multiplier 
AFSC Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone E 
Contracting 7.0 7.0 7.0 4.5 
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Table 4.   Reenlistment Zones 
 
Zones Length of Service Average SRB Contracting’s SRB Statutory Max 
Zone 
A 


















> than 20 YOS $59,000 
$90,000 $90,000 
In 2005, more than 30,000 servicemembers were projected to be recruited, but 
results ended up with 19,000, creating a shortfall as that year group continues to move 
through their careers. 
But, this year the Air Force is also targeting senior NCOs in eight AFSCs, 
including four specialties that last year were not eligible for re-up bonuses. 
In career fields that are chronically undermanned, the bonus rates have not 
changed from last year. For example, explosive ordnance disposal, tactical air control, 
special operations weather and contracting airmen retain the highest multiplier of seven 
in zones A, B, and C when compared to the seventy-eight career fields eligible for 
bonuses. Selective reenlistment bonuses are calculated by multiplying an airman’s 
monthly base pay with the number of years for which he/she reenlists, and multiplying 
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that by the multiplier assigned to his/her enlistment zone. Half of the bonus is paid when 
an airman reenlists and the rest is paid annually over the airman’s new term.  
The Air Force reviews the SRB structure twice a year to keep up with the 
changing retention environment and our mission changes. The expectation is high for 
retention over the next couple of years, but there are still significant needs within a 
variety of AFSCs and within specific zones that make selective reenlistment bonuses a 
primary force management tool for the enlisted force.” 
(www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/01/air-force-2011-service-retention-bonuses-
010211w/)  No other career field receives higher SRBs than personnel in contracting. The 
contracting SRB multiplier is the maximum amount relative to statutory limits.    
2. FY 2011 Retention Measures (Officer) 
In order to address officer retention concerns, contracting, control and recovery 
were approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness in FY09 as critical skills and are currently receiving a CSRB. As a result, the 
CSRB is significant in our analysis as the potential total personnel cost can be reduced 
and applied to new acquisition initiatives. The projected CSRB costs for FY12 are 
approximately $9M ($2.8M budgeted for control and recovery and $6.2M for 
contracting). The largest bonuses are allocated to doctors and dentists with “critical 
wartime skills (Rolfsen, 2010).” These critical positions qualify for one-time bonuses of 
up to $300,000, initially, to join, for a four year obligation (Rolfsen, 2010).   
Retention efforts to maintain the desired number of servicemembers in Air Force 
contracting, using the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) has extended to the 
contracting officer ranks as well. Select Air Force contracting officers are eligible to 
receive a retention bonus as part of the service's fiscal year 2010 Critical Skills Retention 
Bonus Program. Officers eligible will receive $20,000 per year if they sign a four-year 
CSRB agreement for a maximum of $80,000. This is the second year a retention bonus 
has been offered to eligible contracting officers who are in high demand at stateside and 
deployed locations around the world. According to Major Thomas Clohessy, the intent  
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of the contracting CSRB is to retain senior company grade officers who possess extensive 
contracting experience. "This is another vital tool at the disposal of Air Force leaders to 
manage the force and meet mission needs." 
As stated earlier, even with bonus initiatives available, the acquisition contracting 
workforce struggles to maintain a competitive advantage through the use of bonuses and 
continues to lose its critical personnel in contracting. This inability to compete with the 
outside sector in terms of pay and benefits has deteriorated the intellectual leverage of the 
contracting career field (Salomon, 2007).   
In order to present legitimate costs comparisons, metrics were selected from the 
FY2011 MCSPRR. The DoD and the Office of Under Secretary (Comptroller) manage 
the development and execution of the Defense budget; there is renewed emphasis on 
improving financial management across the Department to ensure that taxpayer resources 
are managed wisely and efficiently. The bottom line, as always, is to ensure that the U.S. 
military has the resources needed to protect and defend the United States, its interests, 
and its people ((Comptroller), 2012). The data collection theory used for cost accuracy 
was based on: (1) available data; (2) the relevancy of the parameter for comparison 
purposes; and (3) the understanding of discriminating factors. The amount shown in 
Table 5 represents the “Programmed Amount,” which differs from the MCSPRR, in that 
it includes costs for recruitment, advertising, training, subsidized groceries, education 
assistance, child development, and other costs that are incurred through the provision of 
nonmonetary benefits to military members (Fox, 2010).   
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Table 5.   Military Cost Elements And Data Sources (From 
www.defenselink.mil/comptroller) 
 




Basic Allowance (BAH & BAS) 
Incentive Pay 
Special Pays 
Allowance  * 
Subsistence in Kind 
Family Subsistence Supplemental 
Allowance 
Social Security and Medicare 
Permanent Change of Station – All 
but Separation Travel 
Permanent Change of Station – 
Separation Travel 











































Education Assistance (e.g., GI Bill) 
Other Military Personnel Costs * 
Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health 
Care Fund 
   
Health Care (AD and AD FM) 
Acceleration Factor in FY09 
$8,672.00 $8,672.00 $8,672.00 
Education Assistance $628.00 $628.00 $628.00 
Discount Groceries $322.00 $322.00 $322.00 
Child Development (Facilities) $312.00 $312.00 $312.00 
Training $5,060.00 $5,060.00 $5,060.00 
Recruitment, Advertising, Etc. $629.00 $629.00 $629.00 
DoDEA and Family Assistance $1,519.00 $1,519.00 $1,519.00 
Child Education (Impact Aid) $928.00 $928.00 $928.00 
Veterans’ Employment and Training $9.00 $9.00 $9.00 
Treasury Contribution to Retirement $7,119.00 $7,119.00 $7,119.00 
Treasury Contribution for 
Concurrent Receipts 
$1,236.00 $1,236.00 $1,236.00 
Treasury Contribution to MERHCF  $8,675.00 $8,675.00 $8,675.00 
Veterans’ Benefits (Cash & In-Kind) $3,367.00 $3,367.00 $3,367.00 
Total $131,935.00 $141,743.00 $179,058.00 
*Allowances include: Uniform Clothing, Station Allowance Overseas, CONUS 
COLA, Family Separation, Personal Money Allowance, and General and Flag Officers  
* Other Military Personnel Costs include: Adoption, Partial Dislocation, 




G. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
1. Current Organizational Structure 
In late 2005, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Contracting 
(SAF/AQC) chartered the Installation Contracting Realignment Study to thoroughly 
examine the current state of active duty CONUS installation acquisition support. The 
study also revealed inconsistent use of skilled contracting resources and an inability to 
leverage economies of scale for the Air Force to delivery an effective workforce. 
From 2002 through 2006, the DoD hired 4,045 to its Acquisition contracting 
workforce, which equated to 17 percent (does not account for attrition) of the career field 
(Defense, 2007). The workforce chart (Figure 7) demonstrates the categories of recent 
civilian hires for the DoD acquisition workforce.  
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SPRDE  7140  35%  22% 
Contracting  4045  20%  17% 
Logistics  2083  10%  18% 
PM  1338  6%  16% 
BCEFM  1007  5%  14% 
QA  922  4%  13% 
T&E  1455  7%  26% 
IT  701  3%  16% 
FE  542  3%  14% 
Auditing  980  5%  28% 
Purchasing  131  1%  8% 
Other  157  1%  11% 
Mtg Prod  116  1%  9% 
Total  20,680  100%  18% 
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Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering, Program 
Management, and contracting career fields represent the majority of the civilian DoD 
workforce (Defense, 2007). These hires represented 22 percent, 16 percent, and 17 
percent of the respective functional civilian workforce population. In spite of success, the 
Acquisition workforce acknowledges and is addressing the major challenges regarding 
new skill sets and the projected loss of experience and knowledge expected from 
retirements of “Baby Boomers” (Defense, 2007). This issue has impacted every employer 
since half of the national workforce is comprised of “Baby Boomers” and older 
generations. Civilian personnel in the Department and in the Acquisition community 
represent an aging workforce in which 71 percent and 76 percent, respectively, are 
comprised of these retirement-eligible categories (Defense, 2007). As this generation 
retires, competition between government and industry for new hires will intensify. To 
compete for and retain Acquisition talent, the Department is demonstrating that the 
Acquisition workforce is valued. This includes appropriate compensation, development 
and future career opportunities, managerial development, and providing a world-class 
work environment (Defense, 2007).    
These challenges, compounded by an increased contracting workload with more 
complexities and ongoing mission support commitments, were stressing installation 
contracting and Acquisition to effectively perform their missions (Headquarters, 2008). 
The current organization chart, based on correlated personal accounts, illustrates a 
standard workforce structure responsible for performing contracting actions 
(commodities, services and minor construction), providing business advisory and contract 












Figure 8.   Contracting Organizational Chart (Without Warrant Officer) 
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Table 6.   Total Manning Costs by Paygrade FY12 (Without and With Warrant 
Officer) 
Pay Grade # 
Assigned 





Officers*      
O-4 1 $166,559 $166,559 1 $166,559 
O-3 1 $140,582 $140,582 1 $140,582 
O-2 3 $114,651 $343,953  0 $0 
O-1 1 $91,654 $91,654  1 $91,654 
WO-1 0 $103,267 $0 2 $206,534 
Officer 
Totals 
6  $742,748 5 $605,329 
Enlisted*      
E-7 2 $107,647 $215,294  2 $215,294 
E-6 5 $93,337 $466,685           5 $466,685 
E-5 7 $79,393 $555,751  7 $555,751 
E-4 2 $65,526 $131,052  2 $131,052 
E-3 2 $51,994 $103,988  2 $103,988 
Enlisted 
Totals 
18  $1,472,770 18 $1,472,770 
Total 24  $2,215,518 23 $2,078,099 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
*2012 Military Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates Department of the Air Force 
H. ORGANIZATIONAL APPLICATION OF WARRANT OFFICER 
The analysis gained from the review of sources in Chapter III, analyzing current 
military compensation cost figures, and the selective reenlistment bonus alternatives to 
resolving retention concerns have presented optimistic insight into the Air Force’s 
capability to implement the Air Force Contracting Warrant Officer Program. Although 
current force structure and operational needs will be case-by-case specific, there is an 
overarching void constant throughout operational contracting installations. By adopting 
the initiative to implement warrant officers, using a precautious approach will introduce 
two warrant officers to each operational installation, identified with the comparable 
workforce structure in Figure 8 and the cost comparison in Table 6. Consequently, with 
71 operational bases identified within the IAT report, a total of 142 warrant officer 
positions are likely to be implemented Air Force wide.  
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The most commonly recognized improvements can be identified in the areas of 
resources, retention, and the need to recoup savings. The goal of the modified contracting 
organizational chart is to improve both in-house continuity and accuracy in procurement, 
while meeting the SECDEFs cost savings initiative. The fundamental foundation in 
restructuring is the added benefit gained by multiple stakeholders invested in the 
transparent and efficient DoD procurement process. As a result, in evaluating the Air 
Force Contracting Organizational Structure costs, it was determined that by 
implementing a Contracting Organizational Structure with warrant officers, versus an 
organization without, would result in an estimated delta cost savings of $9.7 million 
annually. 
The total cost delta between Air Force Contracting Organizational Structures with 
and without Warrant Officers is summarized in (Table 7): 
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71 x 









Figure 9.   Contracting Organizational Chart (With Warrant Officer) 
I. CONCLUSION 
The successful implementation of warrant officers in Air Force contracting is 
contingent upon the theoretical alignment of the organization’s behavioral assessment. 
However, strategic implications of any subjective solution are examined on the objective 
outcomes closely associated with the mission impact. Potential objective outcomes can be 
identified as an increase in core competencies, decreased Procurement Administrative 
Lead Time (PALT) and Contract Acquisition Lead Time (CALT), or an increase in 
retention figures. The accurate determination of these objectives will need additional 
evaluations currently not addressed within this study. Another way the implementation of 
warrant officers can influence mission success is demonstrated in the cost savings 
analysis.  
As stated in Chapter II, there is significant opportunity for financial and 
managerial advancements in the civilian sector for purchase managers. As it stands now, 
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bonus programs offered to enlisted servicemembers and officers within the contracting 
career field have the potential to meet retention goals, but thus far have delivered a 
marginal upside. Subsequently, millions of dollars have been devoted to a program not 
obtaining the desired impact of retaining skilled personnel. Air Force bonuses are maxed 
out and other alternatives are needed to motivate retention of knowledge. Additionally, 
cost savings can be identified with a more efficient structure.         
This analysis recommends further research to design a database with the least cost 
and the greatest benefit to the Air Force. The highest levels of authority in the 
Department need to engage in providing incentives to institute this change across the 
Acquisition System. There has to be a driving force focused on enhanced environment 
with career incentives for the workforce, whether procedural, operating capabilities, 
increased funding, or healthy compensation based. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
As the Air Force and our nation continue to evolve and grow, so too the 
requirements and approaches to organizations within the Air Force must grow and 
evolve. Focusing on the Contracting career field, specifically, has brought about the 
realization that the organizational structure with which contracting operates must be 
revitalized. The U.S.’s budgetary challenges, in addition to staffing constraints, have 
brought about the need for the Air Force to revisit the warrant officer program. The 
reinstatement of the warrant officer program would address some of the challenges and 
setbacks of the current Contracting force structure. The warrant officer program would 
allow prospective Non-Commissioned Officers to enter into a competitive and 
challenging program that would encompass the values, practices, and techniques 
necessary to evolve our acquisition workforce. Their skills will be harnessed and 
structured towards increasing competitive advantage and technical prowess in the 
contracting career field.  
Summary. This chapter lays out an implementation plan for developing an Air 
Force Warrant Officer program. 
B. OVERVIEW 
The Warrant Officer Candidate School for the Air Force would aim to provide 
suitable enlisted candidates a chance to become technical experts, teachers, and liaisons 
in the contracting career field. Every airman involved in the Warrant Officer Candidate 
School would be taught discipline and given clear guidance concerning the execution of 
warrant officer training. A course curriculum breaking down the warrant officer program 
must be developed to provide clear standards in addition to precise guidance concerning 
the Air Force Warrant Officer Candidate School training. 
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The intent of the Warrant Officer Candidate School will be to develop and 
evaluate the technical abilities and leadership skills of select qualified airmen who strive 
for an appointment in the United States Air Force Contracting Career Field. In addition, 
Warrant Officer Candidate School will enable our most talented contracting personnel to 
further their knowledge, becoming experts, leaders, and liaisons between the officer and 
enlisted branches. The Warrant Officer Candidate School program will also enable 
qualified airmen to become teachers and retainers of Contracting practical knowledge. 
Warrant Officer Candidate School candidates will demonstrate task mastery through 
skill, application, and fine tuning their talents and skills throughout the program. 
Implementing a program that sustains a demanding and stressful environment to 
test candidates’ experience and maturity will be essential for furthering existing skills, 
and tempering candidates’ abilities, in addition to helping prior enlisted candidates 
achieve their highest leadership potential. In training to become a warrant officer, 
candidates must not only lead their enlisted personnel, but they must also “lead” the 
officers above them with sound counsel, experience, and judgment. Candidates entering 
the program will already possess the skills to manage and perform the tasks given to 
them. The Warrant Officer Candidate School will be built around teaching candidates 
additional skills that will enable the candidates to focus and harness their talents in such a 
way as to be able to lead others, accomplish oversight, and mitigate contracting issues. 
Training tasks will be based around contracting efforts and activities that when performed 
one at a time, are manageable, especially when unfettered with time constraints or stress. 
However, when stress, time constraints, and multiple contracting activities are combined, 
candidates must rely on their knowledge, prioritization, delegation, and leadership skills 
to lead their groups, flights, or squadrons to mission accomplishment. The candidates 
who succeed in this environment will become warrant officers in the United States Air 
Force. 
The proposed curriculum will be designed to complement and enhance the 
Warrant Officer Candidate School environment while providing the requisite 
preappointment training. Structured warrant officer candidates and instructor time will be 
based on creating opportunities for evaluating and developing leadership skills. The Air 
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Force Warrant Officer Candidate School would utilize Contingency Contracting 
environments in addition to Field Leadership Exercises as vehicles to provide 
opportunities in evaluating the warrant officer candidates. The candidates would be 
required to demonstrate leadership abilities while under stressful circumstances, which 
would be in the form of a bull-headed high ranking officer making illegal procurement 
demands or in the situation of a contingency environment, where the contracting officer 
has significant power and capability with limited oversight. Simulated deployed 
operations in addition to mock homeland disaster scenarios will require candidates to 
quickly analyze a situation and develop, communicate, and implement their contracting 
knowledge to demonstrate capability, skill, and leadership principles. Candidates are not 
expected to become commanders and are not evaluated against this standard. However, 
they will be evaluated on their ability to be the knowledge base, basis of reasoning and 
know-how of contracting. Warrant officers are expected to be leaders and will be 
evaluated on their maturity in utilizing their existing knowledge and abilities and to 
navigate their way through stressful environments where command and customers may 
not be rational. The warrant officer program will be aimed at developing airmen in a 360-
degree approach towards balancing and meeting mission accomplishment in addition to 
making the right calls and decisions in the operational contracting environment. 
The Warrant Officer Candidate School program will develop existing enlisted 
members Contracting Specialists with Signature Authority who will be able to act as 
liaisons between the officers and enlisted personnel in addition to acting as trainers and 
leaders of excellence. The Warrant Officer Candidate School would provide mission-
ready capable and unit-ready warrant officers for the Contracting Career Field. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Data was collected using qualitative information taken from the OCS WOCS 
Course Manager of the 185th Regiment Regional Training Institute out of Fort Rucker, 
Alabama and The United States Army Course Management Plan (CMP) #020-09W and 
911-09W. The interviews with the Course Manager and the data from the Course 
Management Plan were then analyzed to determine the best means of building an outline  
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for an Air Force warrant officer program. The use of information from the Course 
Manager and the Course Management Plan would mitigate the risk of implementing a 
similar program for Air Force warrant officers.  
D. ARMY’S WARRANT OFFICER PROGRAM AND ANALYSIS 
This section will serve to explain the Army’s warrant officer program. The 
section will look at the phases of training, candidate selections, and the command 
structure. Not all aspects of this Warrant Officer Training Plan will be incorporated or 
utilized by the proposed Air Force Warrant Officer Training plan (discussed later). The 
intent is to give background and understanding of how a current and successful warrant 
officer program is being run and administered. All information below is paraphrased and 
summarized from the United States Army Course Management Plan (CMP) #020-09W 
and 911-09W, which is the most current, up-to-date plan which supplements the ongoing 
warrant officer training school, which is currently active at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The 
Army Warrant Officer Training School is broken up into three phases: 
 
- Phase I. Online or In-Resident Training. Curriculum is Warrant Officer 
Candidate School specific. 
o Distance Learning:  This is a six month “perform-at-your-own-pace” 
home station computer-based testing and exams. This allows the 
candidate’s respective unit to save money by not having to send the 
candidate in residence. 
o In Resident:  This is a two week program at the Warrant Officer 
Career College for members that are not eligible to take the home 




- Phase II. This is a five week in-resident program that takes place at the 
Regional Training Institutes for Guard and Reserve units while Active 
Military attend Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker in Alabama. 
Training is derived around the following: 
• Required Readings 
• Warrant Officer Candidate School lessons 
• Awareness Training  
• Warrior task and battle drill lessons  
• Regional specific training 
- Phase III. This is a fifteen day active duty training for active, guard, and 
reserve components that is performed in-resident at one of the respective 
Regional Training Institutes. This phase encompasses evaluations of 
leadership in addition to going before boards, and performing outlined tasks. 
Warrant officers in the Army are made up of two distinct fields:  those who are 
aviators and those who are technicians. The technicians are those who are experts in their 
respective career fields, usually prior enlisted personnel composed of the rank of E-5 or 
above. The aviators can be of prior enlisted background or can originate as civilians 
entering the program. Those entering the program as prior enlisted personnel must 
receive recommendation from their respective command, and candidates must meet 
prerequisites, in addition to being qualified for an appointment to include, height, weight, 
and physical fitness standards to be eligible for selection into the Warrant Officer 
Program. Guard and Reserve members must meet the Federal Recognition Requirements 
which are outlined in the National Guard Reserve 600-1-1 (NGR600-1-1). 
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Figure 10.   Warrant Officer Candidate School Command Training and Structure 
 
• Tactical Officers perform all duties and responsibilities as the first-line 
trainer, counselor, and mentor for candidates. They are trained and 
certified. Tactical officers recommend disposition of candidates to the 
senior Tactical Officer, as needed 
• Senior Tactical Officers are selected prior to the beginning of the phase, 
whether Phase II or Phase III. They are trained and certified. Senior 
Tactical Officers recommend disposition of candidates to Warrant Officer 
Company Commanders, as needed. 
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• Warrant Officer Company Commanders are selected prior to the 
beginning of the phase, whether Phase II or Phase III. Company 
Commanders must be CW4s who have been previously trained and 
certified, but they are not Tactical Officers training team members during 
the cycle. Warrant Officer Company Commanders recommend the 
disposition of candidates to Warrant Officer Deputy Commandants, as 
needed. 
• RTI Warrant Officer Deputy Commandants are selected prior to the 
beginning of the phase, whether Phase II or Phase III. Deputy 
commandants must be CW5s, who are trained and mentored by deputy 
commandants in other units. Deputy Commandants have final disposition 
authority for all candidate issues. Deputy Commandants report directly to 
RTI commandants and provide timely updates on candidate issues. 
• RTI Commandants serve as the appellate authorities for candidates who 
appeal disposition actions approved by the RTI Warrant Officer Deputy 
Commandants. 
(Guard, 2009) 
E. PROMOTION OF WARRANT OFFICERS 
1. Criteria quoted from the Warrant Officer Management Guide: 
a. The promotion of warrant officers will be based on a sound level 
of technical and tactical competence, time in grade, military 
education, and progressive levels of expertise, leadership and 
potential for service in the next higher grade. 
b. Promotion will not be used solely as a reward for past 
performance. 
c. Promotion will be made without regard to race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
 62
d. All warrant officers recommended for promotion must be fully 
qualified under the terms of this WO Management Guide and the 
respective State Defense Force and Active Duty regulations. 
e. Promotion from WO1 to CW5 is the responsibility of the 
Personnel Review Board. 
f. Promotions should be in accordance with the established minimum 
time-in-grade provided the warrant officer meets the above 
promotion criteria per State Defense Force guidelines and 
respective Active Duty regulations. Promotion orders will be 
published by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. A copy of the 
promotion order shall be forwarded to the unit. 
g. Promotions from W1 through CW5 will be based upon the written 
recommendations of the immediate commander with subsequent 
concurrence of each intermediate commander. 
(Defense, WARRANT OFFICER MANAGEMENT GUIDE, 2011) 
F. ANALYSIS 
The existing Army Warrant Officer Candidate School program provides a good 
baseline and structure for the Air Force to utilize in developing and implementing a 
program to sustain its warrant officer needs. The phase approach will be an essential 
element of the program for progression and assessing candidates’ skills and abilities. 
However, this paper does not address or utilize the guard and reserve portion of the 
Army’s training plan. The focus of this paper is to enhance the Air Force active duty 
contracting component with respects to experience, technical knowledge, and retaining 
our most skilled and talented contracting officers. Currently the Air Force Contracting 
career field is hurting on active-duty end strength and has lost significant competitive 
advantage with respects to administering and negotiating contracts.  
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G. PROPOSED AIR FORCE WARRANT OFFICER CURRICULUM 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the course curriculum will be to create an outline of the course 
requirements and specify the core function and responsibilities of an Air Force Warrant 
Officer Candidate School. The curriculum will provide the structure, background, and 
detailed information pertaining to the conduct, execution, and administration of Warrant 
Officer Candidate School training. The curriculum will be directed at the Contracting 
Career Field and will be designed to create a foundation for becoming a technical expert 
in addition to teaching future warrant officers to becoming a bridge between the enlisted 
and officer corps.  
2. Warrant Officer Candidates 
Selection of the Air Force’s top contracting specialists is the key to the successful 
implementation of a warrant officer program. Warrant officer candidates will be enlisted 
members in the contracting career field. Applicants would receive written 
recommendation and approval from their respective supervisors and commanders before 
being considered for Warrant Officer Candidate School entry. This ensures that warrant 
officer candidate knowledge, experience, and education requirements are met prior to 
entering training. Enlisted members who recently crossed trained into the contracting 
career field would not be an appropriate candidate for becoming a contracting warrant 
officer due to a lack of contracting skill and experience. Warrant Officer Candidate 
School instructors should consist of qualified DoD civilian, senior enlisted, and officer 
personnel with significant knowledge, experience, and expertise in the contracting career 
field. The staff’s primary intent will be focused on selecting the most qualified 
candidates. In addition, the staff will set a tone that training and maintaining of progress 
is critical to the successful completion of the candidates’ training. However, as with any 
training course, the ultimate success of the students will depend on their attitude, effort, 
and capability. Candidates will be required to adhere to the following guidelines and all 
regulatory guidance pertaining to Warrant Officer Candidate School as follows: 
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• The candidate should meet all course prerequisites pertaining to time in 
service, having possessed signature authority, in addition to written 
recommendation from supervisors and squadron commanders. These 
prerequisites are paramount prior to enrollment in Warrant Officer 
Candidate School.  
• The Candidate is to meet all physical, academic, and leadership 
performance requirements. Candidates are subject to a urinalysis screening 
throughout their attendance at Warrant Officer Candidate School. They 
must meet the requirements of each phase of training before moving on to 
the subsequent phase. Candidates must also meet all graduation 
requirements before being recommended for appointment as WO1s. 
3. Course Design and Sequencing 
Course Design. Air Force Warrant Officer Candidate School, by design, will be a 
demanding and rigid leadership development course. An Air Force Warrant Officer 
Candidate School guide should be developed and should contain detailed discussions on 
how to establish and maintain the Warrant Officer Candidate School learning 
environment. 
Course Sequence. The curriculum will be written out and stated in terms of Air 
Force Warrant Officer Candidate School lessons and modules that are to be taught in 
each phase of training. The program should be designed so as to have potential students 
being selected by their respective supervisor and commander and submitting a package to 
a consolidated warrant officer selection board prior to being allowed to enroll in Phase I 
of the school. 
Phase Training. The Air Force Warrant Officer Candidate School program will 
be a nine-week program built upon three phases.  
• Phase I (Two Weeks):  This phase will be Federal Acquisition 
Regulation specific training based in a classroom environment 
examining and investigating the application and usage of the FAR. 
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It will evaluate students’ utilization of written “what if” scenarios, 
how the FAR applies, and will end with exams and practical 
knowledge tests. 
• Phase II (Four Weeks):  This phase will be in Garrison Scenarios 
and Contingency Based Training and Application. Candidates will 
be evaluated based on their ability to perform tasks and duties in 
Garrison, Deployed, and Natural Disaster environments. 
• Phase III (Three Weeks):  Candidates will plan, prep, and go 
before leadership and contracting boards to have their training 
evaluated by leadership. This will be the culmination of the 
Warrant Officer Candidate School program.   
Candidates will take written exams at the end each module accomplished. All 
candidates will be measured throughout the phases on a percentile scale and must pass all 
phases with a 75 percent or better to have met requirements. (Guard, 2009) 
4. Promotion of Warrant Officers 
Warrant Officers in Air Force Contracting would have to promote based on 
promotion boards that will examine the candidates’ records, recommendations, work 
experience, and current knowledge. The make-up of members serving on the promotion 
board should consist of the following: 
 
• Senior Warrant Officers (After sufficient time has passed and they are 
developed) 
• Senior enlisted personnel 
• Commissioned Contracting Officers of the rank 0-4 or higher 
• DoD Civilians (GS 13 and above) 
• Possess signature authority 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level II or III 
The board should be focused on determining the general qualifications of each 
applicant to evaluate suitability for higher grade as a warrant officer and in the 
 66
Contracting Career Field for which the applicant is applying by considering the following 
criteria:   
• Military education in Contracting.  
• Civilian education relating to Contracting.  
• Military experience relating to Contracting.  
• Civilian experience relating to Contracting (if any).  
• Duty performance and leadership potential (consideration of past duty 
assignments, overall performance and demonstrated support in the 
attainment of the units mission, leadership potential and suitability for 
assignment of greater responsibility as a warrant officer).  
Individuals who are passed over for promotion twice are examined to make sure 
that they are still fit to operate in their position. (Defense, WARRANT OFFICER 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE, 2011) 
5. Warrant Officer Jobs 
W-1s through W-3s will work flight level Contracting consisting of either Deputy 
Flight Leads or Deputy Team Chiefs. W-4s through W-5s will work systems level 
Contracting working in positions of team leads. 
6. Proposed Training Location 
Fort Rucker, Alabama would be the ideal location for an Air Force Warrant 
Officer Candidate School. This location has an existing Army Warrant Officer Candidate 
School in place, in addition to the infrastructure and training facilities to support the 
proposed Air Force warrant officer training mission. In addition, Fort Rucker’s location is 
within the proximity of the Defense Acquisition University’s south eastern satellite 
location in Huntsville, Alabama. Being able to tap into the existing Army’s veteran 
warrant officer community in addition to the nearby contracting knowledge facility in 
Huntsville, Alabama would allow candidates and trainers access to the most pertinent 
knowledge, training, and experience base for creating a successful warrant officer 
program. In addition, “Fort Rucker’s mission of the Warrant Officer Career College is to 
educate and train warrant officer candidates and senior warrant officers at key points in 
their career. Fort Rucker serves as the focal point for the U.S. Army warrant officer 
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professional and leader development matters diverse” (Defense, 2011). Given that Fort 
Rucker has the existing foundation, background, and spirit of a true warrant officer 
training school, this would be an ideal fit for the Air Force Warrant Officer Candidate 
School.  
7. Conclusion 
The implementation of an Air Force warrant officer program is both a feasible 
option and one that is in alignment with the Air Force’s future goals, objectives, and 
vision. The road towards implementing the warrant officer training program may initially 
be difficult, however, given the existing Army warrant officer training program template, 
which is successful and ongoing, the Air Force can utilize this to facilitate its own 
success. Copying the Army’s existing Warrant Officer Training Plan will mitigate risk to 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
The objective of this research was to provide an in-depth view of the current 
contracting organizational structure and the impact of adding warrant officers by using an 
analysis of organizational theory and costs. Next, an implementation plan, including 
selection, training, and promotion criteria was developed. We began our research by 
asking and answering the following questions: 
1. How will warrant officers fit into the AF contracting system?  
 
2. What are the benefits of having warrant officers?  
 
3. Will having warrant officers incentivize enlisted members to stay in Air 
Force contracting, helping to retain both experience and knowledge? 
 
4. What type of cost advantage or disadvantage will warrant officers bring to 
the Air Force? 
B. WARRANT OFFICER MODEL  
The section on the warrant officer model covered the first three research 
questions. Research questions were answered by an analysis utilizing surveys and 
questionnaires which analyzed the commander’s viewpoint on the benefits of a warrant 
officer in addition to the current job satisfaction and embeddeness of current contracting 
enlisted professionals in operational contracting. Commanders revealed mixed feelings 
on warrant officers working in the organization. They could see the warrant officer 
improving training programs and adding Signature Authority to each unit. They also 
suggested the warrant officer may cause problems in a power struggle with SNCOs and 
CGOs. Overall, commanders believed warrant officers would add mentorship to each 




C. COST ANALYSIS DETERMINATIONS AND FINDINGS 
The costs analysis of an Air Force Operational Contracting Organizational 
Structure with Warrant Officers provided insight to an alternative method to meet the 
DoD’s budgetary constraints. After developing a new contracting organizational 
structure, we analyzed the change in personnel costs. The implementation of our 
contracting structure with warrant officers resulted in $9.7 million in annual savings in 
personnel costs. This quantified savings has a potential long term return on investment of 
$97 billion over the first ten years, aiding the ten year savings initiative set by President 
Obama. The value in implementing a warrant officer program in Air Force contracting 
would substantially decrease personnel costs over the long term and immediately enhance 
the core competency of a critically skilled career field.  
D. TRAINING PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of an Air Force warrant officer program will be structured 
best if utilizing the existing Army Warrant Officer Training plan. The benefits of using 
an existing program are that the program is tried and tested, which will require only 
minor modifications for implementation to fit the Air Forces’ needs. A warrant officer 
program is a feasible endeavor in addition to being in alignment with the Air Force’s 
budgetary goals, intent to retain qualified contracting personnel, and giving substantial 
assistance to maintaining competitive advantage.  
E. LIMITATIONS AND IMPROVEMENT 
The approach to our research was carefully and methodically prepared, however, 
there are limitations and shortcomings that must be addressed. The surveys that were 
conducted were restricted due to the limited number of bases contacted which resulted in 
twenty-three responses to the surveys from twelve bases. By receiving more responses, 
the findings would be more supported and reliable. In addition, had surveys been 
available to all enlisted personnel, more responses would have been received. 
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Second, our study was focused on military personnel realignment with status quo 
civilian structure. A professionalized military structure may result in potential 
optimization of the civilian personnel structure. Further research could be done to analyze 
how these changes impact the civilian personnel structure. However, the majority of the 
contracting workforce is DoD civilians.  
Third, the study assumed that warrant officers would, in fact, increase the Air 
Force’s contracting expertise and improve retention. There are no existing warrant 
officers in contracting and as a result no quantifiable data was able to be collected on 
their effect on productivity or turnover.  
Fourth, our cost model of Air Force warrant officers considers only end-state 
personnel costs. Transition costs and other than personnel costs are not considered. 
Last, our research serves only as a baseline for additional study. That said, there is 
room for expansion and growth for research into warrant officers in the Air Force. 
F DISCUSSIONS 
Government regulation stipulates that agencies shall ensure that sufficiently 
trained and experienced officials are available within the agency to manage and oversee 
the contract administration function (FAR, 37.102(h), 2004, p. 886). Scholars, generals, 
and government oversight organizations have all stated publically that DoD acquisition 
agencies are not meeting these regulations, lacking a sufficient number of trained 
personnel (Schooner, 2004, Allen, 2005, Schackelford, 2008, IG, 2003). This failure 
hinders the ability of our workforce to make rational, reasonable decisions, and 
undermines the authority and legitimacy of the leadership, the organization, and 
ultimately the government they represent. Furthermore, in a time of budget uncertainty, 
the government needs the very best with experience. Instituting the warrant officer will 
help with retention and improve procurement efficiency by keeping experience in 
positions where decisions are made every day on the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. 
In the contracting career field, there currently exist areas for potential 
improvements in the organizational structure. Officer expectations are ingrained from 
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entry that members are to lead, to exert influence, and to aggressively pursue command. 
On the other hand, enlisted members are brought up to follow, become knowledgeable 
and proficient in their respective career fields and to one day aspire to be superintendents 
or “chiefs.”  Once an enlisted member gets beyond the rank of E-6, his job shifts away 
from technical proficiency. The enlisted member enters a political spectrum that takes 
aim at networking, managing, upward movement, or retirement. The underlying problem 
is the lack of technical experts, which should fit into the middle tier of the contracting 
career field. Currently, there exists no middle tier for allowing personnel to truly 
specialize in contracting.  
The reorganizational effort to implement warrant officers is an answer to the 
problems seen in the Air Force contracting community. Warrant officers can improve the 
quality of our contracting personnel, increase the career field’s competitive advantage, 
and potentially save the Air Force millions of dollars. The analysis conducted showed 
that warrant officers can be added to a squadron, decreasing overall numbers with cost 
savings. Additionally, there is potential for significant cost savings from improved 
performance once changes have been implemented. The Air Force contracting warrant 
officer will serve as the catalyst and cornerstone for the contracting career field helping 
achieve national strategic goals. Based on our research, these are some of the pros and 
cons indentified: 
G. PROS 
¾ Reduces enlisted voluntary turnover through improved job satisfaction and 
embeddeness  
 
¾ Improve productivity through additional signature authority  
¾ Improve productivity through efficient utilization of human capital   
¾ Improve contracting training knowledge 





¾ Will require the establishment of a training program requiring additional 
resources 
 
¾ May overload contracting signature authority in the operational squadrons 
 
¾ May blur lines of authority with enlisted members and officers in addition 
to the potential for causing organizational structure growing pains 
 
I. CONCLUSION  
The research conducted in this study analyzed a potential advantageous scenario 
of adding warrant officers to the Air Force contract organizational structure and 
established a baseline for more in-depth analysis. With a career field that is severely 
stressed, it has never been more important than it is now for the contracting and 
acquisition workforce to be well trained and motivated to do their jobs. Poorly trained 
and inexperienced personnel pose significant risk to the defense of our nation (Allen, 
2005). The warrant officer is an option for filling gaps in experience and knowledge in 
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APPENDIX A. AFSC SRB CHART 
 
SRB AFSC'S EFFECTIVE 14
AFSC CLEAR-TEXT ZONE A ZONE B ZONE C ZONE E 
1A0X1 IN-FLIGHT REFUELING 2 0 0 0 
1A1X1 FLIGHT ENGINEER 1 1 0 0 
1A2X1 AIRCRAFT LOADMASTER 2 4.5 2 0 
1A4X1 AIRBORNE BATTLE MGT SYS 0 0 1 0 
1A7X1 AERIAL GUNNER 3.5 0 0 0 
1A8X1 AIRBORNE CRYPTO LINGUIST 6 6 6 0 
1A8X2 AIRBORNE ISR OPERATOR 4 5 3 0 
1B4X1 ON-NET OPERATOR 1 0 0 0 
1C1X1 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 6 5.5 4.5 0 
1C2X1 COMBAT CONTROL 7 7 7 0 
1C3X1 COMMAND POST 4 1 3 2 
1C4X1 TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY 7 7 7 4.5 
1C5X1 AERO CON/WARN SYS 1 0 0 0 
1C5X1D AERO CON/WARN SYS (WEAP DIR) 3 1 2 0 
1C6X1 SPACE SYS OPERATIONS 5 0 0 0 
1C7X1 AIRFIELD MANAGEMENT 4 1 1 0 
1N0X1 OPERATIONS INTEL 4 5 4.5 0 
1N1X1A GEOINT ANALYST 6 7 6 0 
1N1X1B GEOINT TARGETEER 3.5 4 4 0 
1N2X1A SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 0 0 2.5 0 
1N2X1C SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 2 0 0 0 
1N3X1 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST 4 6 2 0 
1N4X1 NETWORK INTELLIGENCE 2 3 3 0 
1T0X1 SURV, EVAS, RES, ESCAPE 4 4 4 4.5 
1T2X1 PARARESCUE 7 7 7 0 
1U0X1 RPA SO 6 5 4 0 
1W0X1 WEATHER 2 1 1 0 
1W0X2 SPECIAL OPERATIONS WEATHER 7 7 7 4.5 
2A3X1 A-10, F-15 & U-2 AVIONIC SYS 0 0 1 0 
2A5X1 AERO MAINT 3 1 1 0 
2A5X2 HELICOPTER MAINT 2 0 0 0 
2A5X3C INT AV SYS, ELEC WARFARE 0 2 0 0 
2A7X1 AIRCRAFT METAL TECHNOLOGY 3 0 2 0 
2A7X2 NONDESTRUCTIVE INSP 0 0 3 0 
2A7X3 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINT 0 0 1 0 
2A7X5 LO A/C STRUC MAINT 3 3 3 2 
2M0X1 MSL & SPACE SYS ELECT MAINT 2 0 1 0 
2M0X2 MSL & SPACE SYS MAINT 1 0 0 0 
2M0X3 MSL & SPACE FACILITIES 2 0 0 0 
2R0X1 MAINT MGMT ANALYSIS 2 0 0 0 
2T2X1 AIR TRANSPORTATION 0 0 1 0 
2T3X2A SPEC VEH MAINT FIRE TRUCK 1 0 0 0 
2T3X2C SPEC VEH MAINT MHE 1 0 0 0 
2T3X7 VEHICLE MGMT & ANALYSIS 0 1.5 1 0 
2W2X1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 3 0 1 2 
3D0X2 CYBER SYSTEMS OPS 2 2 0 0 
3D0X3 CYBER SURETY 1 1 0 0 
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3D0X4 COMPUTER SYS PROGRAMMING 0 1 2 0 
3D1X7 COMM CABLE & ANTENNA 0 1 0 0 
3E0X1 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 2 0 0 0 
3E2X1 PAVEMENT & CONST EQUIPMENT 4 0 0 0 
3E3X1 STRUCTURAL 6 0 0 0 
3E4X1 WATER & FUEL SYS MAINT 2 0 0 0 
3E5X1 ENGINEERING ASSISTANT 3 0 0 0 
3E6X1 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 6 2 4 0 
3E8X1 EXPLOSIVE ORD DISPOSAL 7 7 7 4.5 
3E9X1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 0 0 5 0 
3N0X1 PUBLIC AFFAIRS 3.5 3 0 0 
3N0X2 RADIO&TV BROADCAST 4 1 0 0 
3P0X1A SECURITY FORCES MIL WORK DOG 5 2 0 0 
3S3X1 MANPOWER 0 2 0 0 
 
 
4B0X1 BIOENVIRONMENTAL ENGR 1 0 0 
4C0X1 MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 1 2 4 
4E0X1 PUBLIC HEALTH 0 2 0 
4H0X1 CARDIOPULMONARY LAB 2 1 3 
4N0X1B MEDICAL SERV NEUROLOGY 1 0 0 
4N0X1C AEROSPACE MED SERV (IDMT) 2 2 0 
4N1X1B SURGICAL SERV UROLOGY 1 1 0 
4N1X1C SURGICAL SERV ORTHOPEDICS 0 2 2 
4P0X1 PHARMACY 2 2 0 
4R0X1 DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING 2 0 0 
4Y0X1H DENTAL HYGENIEST 0 0 2 
4Y0X2 DENTAL LABORATORY 1 1 0 
6C0X1 CONTRACTING 7 7 7 
6F0X1 FINANCIAL MGT & COMPTROLLER 1 0 0 
7S0X1 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 0 3 2 
9L0X0 INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR 4 5 2 
9S1X0 TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS SPEC 2 1 0 
NOTES: 
 
(1) AIRMEN'S CAFSC AND DAFSC MUST MATCH THE AUTHORIZED AFSC AS SPECIFIED 
IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE BONUS (EXCEPT IF AUTHORIZED BY AFI 36-2606, PARA 2.11) 
 
(2) AIRMEN WHO POSSESS AN AFSC WITH A PREFIX  
ARE ELIGIBLE FOR THE SRB SPECIFIED ON THIS 
LIST. 
 
(3) AIRMEN WHO POSSESS AN AFSC WITH A SUFFIX 
RECEIVE THE SRB AT THE SAME RATE AS THE SLICK AFSC, 
UNLESS THE AFSC/SUFFIX IS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED ON 
THE LIST 
 
(4) SRB ZONES: 





APPENDIX B. WARRANT OFFICER MOS 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF WARRANT OFFICERS WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
WOMOS Warrant Officer Title Enlisted Feeder MOS 
120A Construction Engineering 
Technician 12K, H, P, R, T, W 




131A Field Artillery Targeting Technician 
11C, 13B, C, D, E, F, M, P, R, 
S, W 
140A Command and Control Systems Technician 14J, & 14S 
140E 
Air and Missile Defense 
(AMD) Tactician/Technician 
(Patriot Systems Technician) 
14E, 14T
 
150A Air Traffic Control Technician 15Q 
150U 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (TUAS) Operations 
Technician 
15W 
151A Aviation Maintenance Technician 
All CMF 15 MOS (Excluding 
15P & 15 Q) 
153A Rotary Wing Aviator All MOSs 
180A  Special Forces Warrant Officer All CMF 18 MOS 
250N Network Management Technician 
All MOSs (Must have 4 years 
IT experience IAW 
prerequisites) 
251A Information Systems Technician 
All MOSs (Must have 4 years 
IT experience IAW 
prerequisites) 
254A Signal Systems Support Technician 
All MOSs (Must have 4 years 
IT experience IAW 
prerequisites) 
270A Legal Administrator 27D 
290A Electronic Warfare Technician 29E or all MOSs with ASI 1J or 1K 
311A CID Special Agent 31D 
350F All Source Intelligence Technician 35F 
350G Imagery Intelligence Technician 35G, H 
350Z Attaché Technician All MOSs with ASI 7 
351L Counterintelligence Technician 35L 
351M Human Intelligence Collection Technician 35M 
352N Traffic Analysis Technician 35N 
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352P Voice Intercept Technician 35P 
352S Non Morse Intercept Technician 35S 
353T Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Technician 35T 
420A Human Resources Technician 42A/42F 
420C Bandmaster All CMF 02 MOS's (ALL CMF 42R and 42S) 
640A Veterinary Services Food Safety Technician 68R, 68S, 68T 
670A Health Services Maintenance Technician 68A  
740A 
 
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear 
and Radiological (CBRN) 
Technician 
74D 
880A Marine Deck Officer 88K 
881A Marine Engineering Officer 88L and Z; 21P, w/ASI S2 
882A Mobility Officer  ALL MOS's 
890A Ammunition Technician 89B, 89D 
913A Armament Systems Maintenance Warrant Officer 91F, 91G, and 91K  
914A Allied Trades Warrant Officer 91W and 91E 
915A Automotive Maintenance Warrant Officer 91A, B, C, D, H, L M, P, X,  
919A Engineer Equipment Maintenance Warrant Officer 91C, D, H, J, L, and X 
920A Property Accounting Technician 92Y, 68J  
920B Supply Systems Technician 92A 
921A Airdrop Systems Technician 92R 
922A Food Service Technician 92G, 68M  
923A Petroleum Systems Technician  92F, 92L, and 92W 
948B Electronic Systems Maintenance Technician 
94D, E, F, H, K, L, R, V, W, 
Y & Z; 39B;
25P or 25S may qualify 
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